Geller v. Brownstone Condominium Ass'n
37 Ill. Dec. 805, 402 N.E. 2d 807, 82 Ill. App. 3d 334 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
An intrusion into the airspace above a landowner's property does not constitute an actionable trespass unless it substantially interferes with the owner's actual use and enjoyment of the land.
Facts:
- Donald Geller was constructing a three-story residence on his real estate.
- The Brownstone Condominium Association owned an adjacent high-rise building, with its north wall located directly on the property line shared with Geller.
- To perform maintenance on its north wall, Brownstone intended to use movable scaffolding.
- This scaffolding would extend from Brownstone's building into the airspace over Geller's property.
- Geller alleged this would interfere with his use of light and air and create a hazard from potentially falling objects.
- Geller's complaint did not allege that the scaffolding would interfere with his actual, practical use of the property or the construction of his residence.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff, Donald Geller, filed an amended complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against Brownstone Condominium Association and its manager, seeking an injunction and damages.
- Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed Geller's action.
- Geller, as the plaintiff-appellant, appealed the trial court's dismissal to the appellate court.
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Issue:
Does the temporary intrusion of scaffolding into the airspace above a landowner's property constitute an actionable trespass when it does not interfere with the owner's actual use of the land?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. JUSTICE McNamara
No. A landowner owns only as much of the airspace above their ground as they can occupy or use in connection with the land, and an aerial intrusion is not an actionable trespass unless it subtracts from the owner's use of the property. The court reasoned that the fundamental principle from precedents like United States v. Causby and Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport is that property ownership in airspace is limited to what is practicably usable by the landowner. To be a trespass, an intrusion must actually interfere with the owner's possession or beneficial use. Here, Geller's complaint did not allege any interference with his actual use of the airspace above his residence under construction. The court distinguished this case from others involving actual physical intrusions onto the land itself, and dismissed the fear of falling objects as a speculative attempt to enjoin future negligence, for which a cause of action was not sufficiently pleaded.
Analysis:
This decision refines the traditional ad coelum doctrine (that a landowner owns the space from the center of the Earth to the heavens) by adopting a modern, practical standard for airspace trespass. It establishes that a mere technical intrusion into airspace is insufficient to state a claim; a plaintiff must demonstrate actual interference with their use or enjoyment of the property. This precedent is significant in urban areas where construction and maintenance often necessitate temporary aerial encroachments over neighboring properties, balancing property rights with the practical needs of adjacent landowners.
