Geljack v. State
671 N.E.2d 163 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
A statute may constitutionally require a criminal defendant to bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, provided that the defense does not negate an essential element of the crime charged.
Facts:
- Kenneth J. Geljack, Jr. was declared a habitual traffic offender, and his driving privileges were suspended for ten years beginning in January 1993.
- In July 1994, Geljack was a passenger in a car driven by his wife when she observed that the car's brakes were failing.
- Despite the apparent brake problem, Geljack's wife and daughter proceeded to and kept a scheduled doctor's appointment.
- While his wife and daughter were in the doctor's office, Geljack decided to drive the car to a nearby brake shop.
- While Geljack was driving to the shop, the car's brakes failed completely, causing him to run a red light.
- A nearby Elkhart police officer witnessed Geljack run the red light and initiated a stop.
Procedural Posture:
- Kenneth J. Geljack, Jr. was charged in an Indiana trial court with operating a motor vehicle while his driving privileges were suspended.
- At his trial, Geljack asserted the affirmative defense that his operation of the vehicle was necessary due to an emergency.
- The trial court instructed the jury, per statute IC 9-30-10-18, that Geljack bore the burden of proving the emergency defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
- The jury convicted Geljack.
- Geljack (appellant) appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals of Indiana (an intermediate appellate court), challenging the constitutionality of the statute that placed the burden of proof on him.
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Issue:
Does an Indiana statute that requires a defendant to prove the affirmative defense of "emergency" by a preponderance of the evidence, when charged with operating a motor vehicle while driving privileges are suspended, unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the defendant?
Opinions:
Majority - Staton, Judge
No. The Indiana statute does not unconstitutionally impose the burden of proof on the defendant. While the State must always prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, it is constitutional to place the burden of proving an affirmative defense on the defendant when that defense serves to justify or excuse the conduct rather than negate an element of the crime. The elements of operating a motor vehicle while suspended are: (1) operating a motor vehicle, (2) while driving privileges are suspended, and (3) knowing that the privileges were suspended. The affirmative defense of an 'emergency' does not negate any of these elements; it merely provides a justification for conduct that would otherwise be criminal. Therefore, because the defense mitigates culpability rather than disproving an element of the offense, the statute constitutionally places the burden of proof on the defendant.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the constitutional distinction between two types of affirmative defenses in criminal law. It solidifies the principle that while the prosecution's burden to prove every element of an offense is absolute, the legislature may shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant for defenses of justification or excuse (e.g., emergency, insanity). The case establishes a clear analytical framework: if a defense negates an element of the crime (like intoxication negating mens rea), the burden cannot be shifted; if it merely excuses the completed crime, it can. This precedent guides lower courts in evaluating the constitutionality of statutes that allocate burdens of proof for various affirmative defenses.
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