Gee v. Nieberg
1973 Mo. App. LEXIS 1122, 501 S.W. 2d 542 (1973)
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Rule of Law:
An executory oral agreement to terminate a written contract that was originally required to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds is valid if it is supported by new consideration and the unexpired term of the contract is less than the period specified by the statute (typically one year).
Facts:
- On July 18, 1969, Sidney Gee and Margaret Gee signed a one-year written lease with their landlord, Marvin C. Nieberg, for an apartment.
- The lease term was to begin on August 1, 1969, and the Gees paid a $315 security deposit, equivalent to one month's rent.
- During the tenancy, conflicts arose over the behavior of the Gees' four children, which Nieberg found disruptive and unsafe, particularly at the complex's swimming pool and on the lawn.
- Nieberg complained to the Gees about their children trampling the lawn with bicycles.
- Following a conversation about the ongoing problems, Nieberg told Margaret Gee, 'You find a place to live and I will release you.'
- Immediately after this conversation, Margaret Gee sought and found a new place for her family to live.
- The Gees moved out on July 28, 1970, with one month remaining on the written lease term, having paid eleven months' rent in addition to the security deposit.
Procedural Posture:
- Sidney and Margaret Gee (plaintiffs) sued Marvin C. Nieberg (defendant) in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County to recover their security deposit.
- The Gees amended their petition to allege that the lease had been terminated by a mutual oral agreement.
- The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the Gees for $315.00 plus interest.
- Nieberg (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Missouri Court of Appeals, with the Gees as appellees.
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Issue:
Does a subsequent oral agreement to terminate a written lease, which was originally required to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds, validly end the parties' obligations when supported by consideration and the unexpired term of the lease is less than one year?
Opinions:
Majority - McMillian, J.
Yes. A subsequent oral agreement to terminate a written lease originally subject to the Statute of Frauds is valid under these circumstances. The court rejected Nieberg's three main arguments. First, the parol evidence rule does not apply because it only bars evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements, not subsequent ones like the agreement here. Second, the oral agreement was supported by new consideration; Nieberg was relieved of what he considered troublesome tenants, and the Gees incurred the detriment of finding a new home in reliance on his promise. Finally, while the Statute of Frauds requires leases over one year to be in writing, and generally bars oral modifications, the court distinguished a modification from a complete termination or rescission. Adopting the modern trend, the court held that an oral agreement to terminate a written lease is enforceable if the unexpired term of the lease is less than the period required by the statute to be in writing. Since only one month remained on the Gees' lease, the oral agreement to terminate was valid and not barred by the Statute of Frauds.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the application of the Statute of Frauds to the termination of contracts, distinguishing between a modification and a rescission. By adopting the 'modern view,' the court established that parties can orally rescind a written contract that was subject to the Statute of Frauds, provided the remaining obligations fall outside the statute's time requirements. This decision provides flexibility for parties to mutually end their agreements without written formalities near the end of a contract's term and prevents the Statute of Frauds from being used to negate a valid, subsequent agreement to terminate.
