Gebardi v. United States
287 U.S. 112 (1932)
Rule of Law:
A person whose participation is indispensable to the commission of a substantive crime, but who is not criminally liable for the substantive crime under the statute, cannot be convicted of conspiracy to commit that crime. This is especially true when the statute reflects an affirmative legislative policy to leave that person's participation unpunished.
Facts:
- Petitioners, a man and a woman who were not married, traveled together across state lines.
- The purpose of these journeys was for the petitioners to engage in illicit sexual relations.
- The man purchased the railway tickets for both petitioners for at least one of these journeys.
- The woman consented in advance to go on the journeys and voluntarily did so for the specified immoral purpose.
- There was no evidence that the woman was the active or moving spirit in conceiving or carrying out the transportation.
- There was no evidence that any person other than the two petitioners was involved in a conspiracy.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioners were indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for conspiracy to violate the Mann Act.
- After a bench trial, the district court found both petitioners guilty.
- Petitioners appealed the conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision.
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Issue:
Does a woman who merely consents to her own transportation in interstate commerce for an immoral purpose, an act for which she is not punishable under the Mann Act, commit the crime of conspiracy to violate that Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Stone
No. A woman whose participation is limited to consenting to her own transportation for an immoral purpose cannot be found guilty of a conspiracy to violate the Mann Act. The Mann Act is directed at the person who transports, not the person who is transported. The statute contemplates that the woman may consent to the transportation, yet it does not impose any penalty on her for such acquiescence. This reflects an affirmative legislative policy to leave her participation unpunished. To allow a conviction under the general conspiracy statute for the very conduct the Mann Act implicitly immunizes would directly contravene this legislative policy. Since the woman committed no crime by consenting, she cannot be a co-conspirator. As there was no evidence the man conspired with anyone else, his conviction must also be reversed.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Cardozo
Concurred in the result without a written opinion.
Analysis:
This case establishes an important limitation on the scope of conspiracy law, preventing it from being used to circumvent the specific intent of a substantive criminal statute. It holds that where a statute is designed to protect a certain class of persons, or to punish only one party in a bilateral transaction, the other party cannot be prosecuted for conspiracy based on their necessary participation. This decision forces courts to analyze the legislative policy behind a substantive offense before allowing a broad conspiracy charge. It affirmed a principle related to, but distinct from, Wharton's Rule, focusing on legislative intent to immunize a necessary participant rather than the logical impossibility of one person committing the crime.
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