Gaston v. Parsons
318 Or. 247, 864 P.2d 1319, 1994 Ore. LEXIS 2 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
In Oregon, the two-year statute of limitations for medical negligence actions under ORS 12.110(4) begins to run when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known facts indicating a substantial possibility of legally cognizable harm, which comprises (1) harm, (2) causation, and (3) tortious conduct. Distinct medical negligence claims, such as negligent surgery and informed consent, are legally separate and accrue independently based on their respective factual bases.
Facts:
- Plaintiff, a partial quadriplegic, possessed functional use of only his left arm.
- Plaintiff sought medical treatment from Dr. Parsons for muscle spasms in his lower body.
- Dr. Parsons suggested a spinal injection procedure involving a chemical solution to deaden nerves causing the spasms.
- Before the surgery on March 12, 1987, Dr. Parsons informed plaintiff of certain risks but did not mention any risk of possible loss of function in plaintiff's left arm.
- After the surgery, plaintiff noticed that his left arm was numb and did not function.
- Dr. Parsons assured plaintiff that the loss of function in his left arm was temporary and that its use would return in six months to two years.
- Plaintiff did not recover the use of his left arm within two years of the surgery.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff filed a medical negligence action against defendants (Parsons and Coit) in November 1990 in the trial court (Circuit Court).
- Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, ORS 12.110(4).
- The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and entered judgment for defendants.
- Plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the informed consent claim was barred, but the negligent surgery claim was not, because the statute of limitations for that claim did not start until plaintiff knew or should have known of defendants’ negligence.
- Defendants petitioned the Supreme Court of Oregon for review.
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Issue:
Does the two-year statute of limitations for medical negligence claims under ORS 12.110(4) begin to run only when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of harm, causation, and tortious conduct, and are claims for negligent surgery and lack of informed consent considered distinct for statute of limitations purposes?
Opinions:
Majority - Unis, J.
Yes, the statute of limitations for medical negligence begins to run when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of harm, causation, and tortious conduct, and claims for negligent surgery and lack of informed consent are distinct for statute of limitations purposes. The court interpreted 'injury' in ORS 12.110(4) to mean 'legally cognizable harm,' which includes three elements: harm, causation, and tortious conduct. The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known facts that would make a reasonable person aware of a substantial possibility that each of these three elements exists. This objective test considers the nature of the harm, the medical procedure, and physician assurances, as untoward effects can mask tortious conduct, and patients reasonably rely on a physician's statements. The court also held that informed consent claims and negligent surgery claims are legally and factually distinct, arising from violations of different legally protected interests and having different standards of care. Therefore, awareness of one claim does not, as a matter of law, put a plaintiff on notice of a separate, distinct claim. The court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding when the plaintiff should have discovered a substantial possibility of tortious conduct for the negligent surgery claim, particularly given Dr. Parsons' assurances.
Dissenting - Peterson, J. pro tempore
No, the statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of harm and causation, not requiring knowledge of tortious conduct, and the legislative history supports limiting, not extending, recoverability. Justice Peterson argued that the plain meaning of 'injury' in ORS 12.110(4), consistent with ORS 12.110(1) and prior case law, refers to knowledge of a causal relationship between the event and the resulting harm, not knowledge of the defendant's fault or tortious conduct. He asserted that the legislative history of ORS 12.110(4) (1967, 1969, and 1971 amendments) clearly aimed to limit the discoverability period for medical malpractice claims, not to expand it by requiring knowledge of tortious conduct. According to the dissent, the plaintiff was aware of significant harm caused by the surgery on the day of the procedure, and Dr. Parsons' assurances about the temporary nature of the injury were irrelevant to the commencement of the statute of limitations, absent an allegation of fraud or deceit. Therefore, the negligent surgery claim should have been barred.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies and expands the application of Oregon's 'discovery rule' in medical negligence cases, making it more favorable to plaintiffs. By defining 'injury' to include 'tortious conduct,' the court ensures that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until a plaintiff has a reasonable basis to suspect medical wrongdoing, even if they are aware of a negative outcome. The emphasis on physician assurances and the distinct accrual of different negligence claims acknowledges the unique informational asymmetry in patient-doctor relationships, potentially increasing the period during which medical professionals can be sued for malpractice. This approach balances the protection of legitimate claims against the legislative goal of preventing stale claims, aligning with the 'fairness' objective of the discovery rule.
