Garrett v. United States
471 U.S. 773 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the government from prosecuting a defendant for a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) violation after a prior conviction for one of the predicate offenses that forms part of the CCE, particularly when the CCE was ongoing at the time of the initial prosecution.
Facts:
- Between 1976 and 1981, Jonathan Garrett directed an extensive marihuana importation and distribution operation that spanned multiple states.
- As part of this operation, Garrett was involved in off-loading approximately 12,000 pounds of marihuana from a ship at Neah Bay, Washington in August 1980.
- Garrett's criminal enterprise involved numerous large-scale drug shipments and conspiracies over a period of more than five years.
- After being indicted for the Washington shipment, Garrett continued his drug smuggling activities.
- Garrett was arrested for traffic offenses in July 1981 while out on bail for the Washington charge, at which time he admitted to being a smuggler and was found with large amounts of cash.
Procedural Posture:
- In March 1981, a grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington (federal trial court) indicted Jonathan Garrett for marihuana importation related to the Neah Bay operation.
- Garrett pleaded guilty in that court to one count of importation of marihuana.
- In July 1981, Garrett was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida (federal trial court) on several charges, including engaging in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE).
- The prosecution used evidence of the Washington importation to help prove the CCE charge.
- Garrett filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the CCE charge on double jeopardy grounds, which the district court denied.
- A jury convicted Garrett on the CCE count, and he was sentenced to a prison term consecutive to his Washington sentence.
- Garrett, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (intermediate appellate court).
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting Garrett's double jeopardy claim.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Eleventh Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bar a prosecution for engaging in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) when evidence of a prior conviction for a drug offense is used as one of the predicate acts to prove the CCE charge?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rehnquist
No. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the CCE prosecution because Congress intended the CCE violation to be a separate offense punishable in addition to its predicate offenses. The Court first determined that the legislative history of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 plainly shows Congress intended to create a new, distinct offense aimed at 'top brass' drug traffickers, not merely a substitute for the underlying crimes. Second, even assuming the predicate offense is a lesser included offense of the CCE, the subsequent prosecution is permissible under the exception established in Diaz v. United States. Because Garrett's CCE was an ongoing crime that had not been completed at the time he was indicted for the predicate offense in Washington, the government was not barred from later prosecuting him for the larger CCE offense that continued after the initial indictment.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. While the prior conviction does not bar prosecution for a CCE that concluded before that offense occurred, it is constitutionally impermissible to use the Neah Bay transaction, for which Garrett was already convicted, as a predicate offense to establish the CCE in a subsequent prosecution. The exception from Diaz v. United States does not apply because all the facts necessary to sustain the CCE charge had occurred and were known to the government before the Washington indictment was returned. The government did not need the Neah Bay offense to prove the CCE charge and allowing its use constitutes a successive prosecution for the same conduct in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
No. The CCE prosecution is permissible by balancing the interests protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A defendant's interest in finality can be outweighed by the public interest in law enforcement, especially where there is no prosecutorial overreaching. Because Garrett continued his unlawful conduct after being prosecuted for the predicate offense, he cannot use the Double Jeopardy Clause as a 'sword' to prevent the government from prosecuting him for the full, continuing violation of the CCE statute. The defendant's voluntary choice to continue his criminal activity weighs against his double jeopardy claim.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to complex, compound-criminal statutes like the CCE provision. It establishes that for ongoing criminal schemes, a prosecution for a single act does not necessarily bar a later prosecution for the entire criminal enterprise. This gives prosecutors greater flexibility, as they are not forced to choose between prosecuting an early predicate offense or waiting until the entire, multi-year enterprise is complete and fully investigated. The ruling reinforces the principle that legislative intent is paramount in double jeopardy analysis and expands the Diaz exception to contexts beyond a victim's death, applying it to ongoing criminal conduct.
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