Raymond Lennard Garnett v. State of Maryland
332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797 (1993)
Rule of Law:
Maryland's second-degree rape statute, criminalizing sexual intercourse with a person under 14 by a person at least four years older, is a strict liability offense. The state is not required to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the victim's age, and a defendant's reasonable mistake of fact as to the victim's age is not a valid defense.
Facts:
- Raymond Lennard Garnett was 20 years old and had a documented I.Q. of 52, functioning at the social and intellectual level of an 11 or 12-year-old.
- Erica Frazier was 13 years old.
- Garnett and Frazier had become acquainted and occasionally talked by telephone.
- On February 28, 1991, Frazier invited Garnett into her bedroom by telling him to climb a ladder to her window.
- Inside her room, Garnett and Frazier engaged in consensual vaginal intercourse.
- On November 19, 1991, Frazier gave birth to a baby, of which Garnett was determined to be the biological father.
Procedural Posture:
- Raymond Garnett was tried on one count of second-degree rape under § 463(a)(3) in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, a state trial court.
- At trial, the defense proffered evidence that Garnett believed the victim was 16 years old.
- The trial court excluded the proffered evidence, ruling that the offense was one of strict liability.
- The trial court found Garnett guilty.
- Garnett noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, the state's intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Appeals of Maryland, the state's highest court, granted a writ of certiorari before the case was heard by the Court of Special Appeals.
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Issue:
Does Maryland's second-degree rape statute (Art. 27, § 463(a)(3)), which criminalizes sexual intercourse with a person under 14, require the State to prove that the defendant knew the victim was underage, or permit a defense of reasonable mistake of age?
Opinions:
Majority - Murphy, C.J.
No. Maryland's second-degree rape statute defines a strict liability offense that does not require the State to prove mens rea and makes no allowance for a mistake-of-age defense. The court's reasoning is based on principles of statutory construction. First, the plain language of § 463(a)(3) is silent as to a mental state, which stands in stark contrast to the immediately preceding subsection, § 463(a)(2), which explicitly includes a 'knows or should reasonably know' standard for intercourse with an incapacitated person. This textual difference indicates a deliberate legislative choice to omit a mens rea requirement for statutory rape. Second, the legislative history of the 1976 revision of sexual offense laws reveals that the legislature considered and explicitly rejected an amendment that would have added a mens rea element regarding the victim's age. This deliberate omission provides clear evidence that the legislature intended to create a strict liability crime. Therefore, any change to this long-standing principle must come from the legislature, not the judiciary.
Dissenting - Eldridge, J.
The statute is not a pure strict liability offense, and the trial court erred by precluding any inquiry into the defendant's mental state. While a mistake of age may not be a defense for an ordinary defendant, § 463(a)(3) is not a pure strict liability statute devoid of any mens rea, especially given the severe felony penalty. The legislature likely assumed that a defendant would possess the mental capacity to appreciate the risk of engaging in sexual activity with a young person. Due to his severe mental retardation, Garnett may have lacked the requisite mental ability to appreciate that risk, and the trial court's ruling prevented any exploration of whether he possessed the minimal mens rea necessary for the crime.
Dissenting - Bell, J.
Yes, a mens rea requirement should be read into the statute because imposing strict liability for this offense violates due process under both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The concept of mens rea is a fundamental principle of justice, and strict liability is generally reserved for minor 'public welfare' offenses, not serious felonies that carry severe penalties and social stigma. By defining the crime to exclude intent, the legislature creates an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption that the defendant possessed the necessary criminal intent simply by committing the act. This relieves the State of its burden of proof and denies the defendant the opportunity to present a defense, which is fundamentally unfair and violates due process.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Maryland's adherence to the traditional, majority view that statutory rape is a strict liability crime, prioritizing the protection of minors over the culpability of the defendant. The court's reliance on statutory construction, particularly legislative intent derived from textual comparison and legislative history, establishes a strong precedent against judicially implying a mens rea requirement where the legislature has been silent or has rejected one. The powerful dissents highlight the constitutional tension between legislative power to define crimes and the due process requirement of a 'guilty mind' for serious felonies, suggesting this remains a contentious area of law that may be revisited by the legislature.
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