Gammons v. Berlat
696 P.2d 700, 1985 Ariz. LEXIS 180, 144 Ariz. 148 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
A.R.S. § 13-501, which establishes a rebuttable presumption of incapacity for criminal responsibility for persons under fourteen years old, does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings because the juvenile code provides a separate and distinct framework for addressing juvenile offenders.
Facts:
- On February 17, 1984, a thirteen-year-old boy was arrested.
- The boy was accused of sexual abuse and sexual conduct with a minor.
- The boy had a purported mental age of 9 or 10.
- The alleged sexual conduct involved a fifteen-year-old girl.
Procedural Posture:
- A petition was filed in juvenile court (Pima County Juvenile Court, No. 90708-1) charging the thirteen-year-old petitioner with delinquency for alleged sexual abuse and sexual conduct with a minor.
- During trial review, the petitioner denied the allegations and, through counsel, requested a hearing to determine his legal capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-501.
- The State opposed the request, arguing A.R.S. § 13-501 was inapplicable to delinquency proceedings.
- A Judge Pro Tempore assigned to the Pima County Juvenile Court case ruled that A.R.S. § 13-501 was not applicable to delinquency proceedings.
- Petitioner sought relief from this ruling by filing a special action with the Arizona Supreme Court, which accepted jurisdiction of the special action (No. 18274-SA).
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Issue:
Does the criminal code's provision establishing a rebuttable presumption of incapacity for criminal responsibility for children under fourteen years of age (A.R.S. § 13-501) apply to delinquency proceedings in juvenile court?
Opinions:
Majority - Holohan, Chief Justice
No, the criminal code's provision establishing a rebuttable presumption of incapacity for criminal responsibility for children under fourteen years of age (A.R.S. § 13-501) does not apply to delinquency proceedings in juvenile court. The court held that the legislature intended the juvenile code to be a separate and independent procedure for handling juvenile offenders, distinct from adult criminal prosecution. A.R.S. § 13-501 codifies a variant of the common law infancy defense to criminal prosecution, but the juvenile code has its own specific provisions for dealing with children, including those under eight (who are considered "dependent children" if they commit certain acts) and those with developmental disabilities or mental illness. The court cited Burrows v. State (1931), which described the purpose of Arizona's juvenile law as providing a special method of treatment for minors, not to establish an arbitrary age for ignorance of consequences. It noted that the criminal code's incapacity provision predated the juvenile act by 25 years and the juvenile code was codified separately. The court found persuasive the rationale of jurisdictions that reject capacity requirements in juvenile proceedings because the purpose of delinquency proceedings is rehabilitative, not to impose criminal sanctions, even though "delinquent act" is defined by reference to criminal offenses.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Feldman, Justice
Yes, the criminal code's provision establishing a rebuttable presumption of incapacity for criminal responsibility for children under fourteen years of age (A.R.S. § 13-501) should apply to delinquency proceedings in juvenile court. Justice Feldman disagreed with the majority's assumption that delinquency adjudication does not result in criminal sanctions. He argued that commitment to the Department of Corrections, even if not called a "prison," constitutes a type of confinement and is a criminal sanction, citing In re Gault (1967). Gault held that due process safeguards are required when criminal sanctions are possible, regardless of euphemistic labeling. He contended that denying a 13-year-old with a mental age of 9 or 10 a capacity hearing before potentially subjecting him to confinement for an act that would require proof of mental capacity in an adult court violates due process. The dissent pointed out the potential for longer incarceration for a juvenile than an adult for the same offense, and that if the minor were prosecuted in adult court, § 13-501 would apply. He emphasized that the State cannot impose criminal sanctions under the guise of treatment without requiring proof of mens rea.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the distinct nature of Arizona's juvenile justice system by affirming its separation from the adult criminal code regarding the infancy defense. The ruling emphasizes the rehabilitative philosophy underpinning juvenile proceedings, even when the acts committed would be criminal for an adult. Future cases will continue to delineate the specific rights and procedural safeguards afforded to juveniles, particularly where the "treatment" rationale might conflict with due process concerns raised by potential incarceration. The dissent highlights a tension that remains a critical area of legal debate: whether the rehabilitative label adequately justifies differential treatment of children, especially concerning fundamental elements of criminal culpability like mental capacity.
