Gammon v. Osteopathic Hospital of Maine, Inc.
534 A.2d 1282 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of severe emotional distress without demonstrating physical impact or objective physical manifestations of the injury if the severe emotional distress was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's negligent conduct.
Facts:
- After Gerald C. Gammon's father, Linwood Gammon, died at Osteopathic Hospital of Maine, Inc., Gammon hired Neal-York Funeral Home, Inc. to handle the arrangements.
- A funeral home employee, Morrill York, went to the hospital morgue to retrieve the decedent's body and personal effects.
- From the morgue cooler drawer containing the body, York took two plastic bags; one was tagged as the decedent's effects, the other was untagged.
- York, assuming both bags contained the decedent's personal effects, delivered them to Gerald Gammon.
- The following morning, Gammon searched the bags and discovered a severed, bloodied human leg in the untagged bag.
- Gammon suffered immediate shock and subsequently experienced nightmares, personality changes, and a deterioration in his family relationships.
- The leg was later identified as a pathology specimen belonging to someone other than Gammon's father.
Procedural Posture:
- Gerald C. Gammon sued Osteopathic Hospital of Maine, Inc. and Neal-York Funeral Home, Inc. in the Superior Court, Cumberland County (the trial court of first instance).
- Gammon's complaint included Count I for negligent infliction of severe emotional distress and Count III for intentional or reckless infliction of severe emotional distress.
- During the trial, the court granted the defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the negligence claim (Count I), preventing the jury from deciding it.
- The intentional tort claim (Count III) was submitted to the jury, which found that Gammon suffered 'severe emotional distress' but that it was not caused by intentional or reckless conduct.
- The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the defendants.
- Gammon, as appellant, appealed the trial court's directed verdict on the negligence claim to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a claim for negligent infliction of severe emotional distress require proof of physical harm, or is it compensable if the distress was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - Roberts, Justice.
No, a claim for negligent infliction of severe emotional distress does not require proof of physical harm; it is compensable if the distress was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence. The court abandoned prior 'more or less arbitrary requirements' such as physical impact, objective manifestation of injury, or an underlying tort, which were used to guard against spurious claims. Instead, the court adopted the traditional tort principle of foreseeability as the standard for claims of purely psychic injury. The court reasoned that jurors and judges can capably evaluate claims of psychic trauma without these artificial barriers, and that the foreseeability standard provides adequate protection against fraudulent claims and unduly burdensome liability. In this case, a jury could find it was reasonably foreseeable that negligently providing a decedent's family with a severed human leg would cause severe emotional distress to an ordinarily sensitive person.
Analysis:
This decision significantly liberalized the standard for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claims in Maine by replacing rigid, categorical prerequisites with the more flexible tort standard of foreseeability. By abandoning requirements like physical impact or objective manifestation, the court aligned itself with a modern trend in tort law that gives greater recognition to purely psychic injuries. This precedent makes it easier for plaintiffs to bring NIED claims, shifting the gatekeeping function from rigid legal rules to the trial process itself, where juries determine the foreseeability of the harm and the genuineness of the plaintiff's distress. Future NIED cases in Maine will now primarily focus on whether the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that their conduct would cause severe emotional distress to a person of ordinary sensitivity.
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