Donovan v. Gerrish

NY: Court of …
63 NY 2d 575, 473 NE 2d 223 (1984)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A lease that expressly grants the tenant the right to terminate at a date of their choice, without a corresponding right for the landlord, creates a determinable life tenancy for the tenant, not a tenancy at will terminable by either party.


Facts:

  • In 1977, Robert Donovan leased a house to Lou Gerrish for $100 per month.
  • The lease agreement, filled out by Donovan on a printed form, stated the term would end when 'Lou Gerrish has the privilege of termination [sic] this agreement at a date of his own choice.'
  • The lease also gave Gerrish a thirty-day grace period for rent payments.
  • Gerrish moved into the house and resided there under the terms of the lease.
  • In November 1981, Donovan died.
  • David Garner, the executor of Donovan's estate, became the new landlord and attempted to evict Gerrish.

Procedural Posture:

  • David Garner, as executor for the estate of Robert Donovan, commenced a summary proceeding in County Court to evict the tenant, Lou Gerrish.
  • The County Court granted summary judgment for Garner, holding that the lease created a month-to-month tenancy terminable by the landlord.
  • Gerrish, as appellant, appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.
  • The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court's decision.
  • Gerrish, as appellant, was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court, with Garner as the appellee.

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Issue:

Does a lease that grants the tenant the sole right to terminate the agreement at a date of his choice create a tenancy at will, thereby allowing the landlord to unilaterally terminate the lease?


Opinions:

Majority - Wachtler, J.

No. A lease that grants the tenant the sole right to terminate creates a determinable life tenancy, not a tenancy at will terminable by the landlord. The court rejected the antiquated common law rule, originating with Lord Coke, that a lease at the will of the lessee must also be at the will of the lessor. The court reasoned that this rule was based on the obsolete conveyancing doctrine of livery of seisin, which is no longer required, and that modern property law should enforce the express terms of an agreement as intended by the parties. Because the lease unambiguously granted the right of termination only to the tenant, Gerrish, it created a life tenancy for him, terminable at his will or, at the latest, upon his death. The landlord does not have a corresponding right to terminate.



Analysis:

This decision formally rejects an outdated, formalistic common law rule in favor of a modern, contract-based approach to interpreting leases. It prioritizes the expressed intent of the parties over a legal fiction rooted in obsolete historical practices. By aligning New York law with the Restatement (Second) of Property, the case provides clarity and predictability, ensuring that lease terms granting a unilateral termination right to a tenant are enforceable as written. This decision strengthens the tenant's position in such agreements and marks a significant step in moving property law closer to modern contract principles.

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