Gallimore v. Children's Hospital Medical Center
67 Ohio St.3d 244, 617 N.E.2d 1052 (1993)
Rule of Law:
In Ohio, a parent may recover damages in a derivative action for loss of filial consortium when a third-party tortfeasor negligently or intentionally causes physical injury to their minor child, and a minor child may likewise recover for loss of parental consortium when their parent is similarly injured.
Facts:
- A minor child named Joshua suffered physical injuries due to the actions of a third-party tortfeasor.
- As a result of these injuries, Joshua was rendered profoundly deaf.
- Joshua’s mother brought a lawsuit seeking to recover damages for her loss of filial consortium, which included the loss of his services, society, companionship, comfort, love, and solace.
Procedural Posture:
- Joshua’s mother brought a derivative action against John F. Gallimore, M.D., Inc. in a trial court.
- The trial court recognized that losses for filial consortium were compensable elements of damage and awarded damages.
- The intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
- John F. Gallimore, M.D., Inc. appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, and the court granted jurisdiction on the issue of law regarding recovery for loss of filial consortium.
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Issue:
Does Ohio law permit parents to recover damages in a derivative action for loss of filial consortium, which includes non-pecuniary elements like society and companionship, when their minor child is physically injured by a third-party tortfeasor; and, conversely, does Ohio law permit a minor child to recover for loss of parental consortium when their parent is physically injured by a third-party tortfeasor?
Opinions:
Majority - Douglas, J.
Yes, parents may recover damages for loss of filial consortium when a third-party tortfeasor causes physical injury to their minor child, and a minor child may also recover for loss of parental consortium. Ohio has long recognized a parent's right to a derivative action for a minor child's medical expenses and loss of services, and previous cases did not explicitly limit these actions to pecuniary losses. The court distinguishes Kane v. Quigley, which involved an amatory action, and clarifies that Whitehead and Grindell did not disregard intangible losses. The court emphasizes that the traditional master-servant analogy for the parent-child relationship is outdated, and modern society recognizes the profound non-pecuniary value (society, companionship, comfort, love, solace) of this relationship. The recent amendment to Ohio's Wrongful Death Act, which allows recovery for loss of society, further supports recognizing similar claims in non-fatal injury cases. The court rejects policy arguments against this recognition, such as difficulty in measuring damages, fears of unlimited liability (by limiting it to parents of minor children), double recovery (juries can be properly instructed), or parents disparaging their children. The court asserts its role in evolving common law, citing its historical establishment of spousal consortium rights, and rejects the argument that such changes should be left solely to the legislature. Finally, the court explicitly overrules High v. Howard, which denied children a cause of action for loss of parental consortium, aligning with the reasoning of the dissent in that case. The court holds that a minor child also has a cause of action for loss of parental consortium, defining it to include society, companionship, affection, comfort, guidance, and counsel. This decision is to be applied prospectively and to the case at bar.
Concurring - Pfeifer, J.
Yes, parents may recover damages for loss of filial consortium, and children may recover for loss of parental consortium. Justice Pfeifer fully supports the majority opinion, asserting that the judiciary has a constitutional responsibility to delineate the proper measure of damages for personal injury claims. He views the General Assembly's amendment to the wrongful death statute, allowing recovery for filial consortium, as a guide and a signal of changing societal sensibilities, not a roadblock to judicial evolution of common law in personal injury cases. He argues that this court is the appropriate body to adapt the common law, especially given its historical role in developing consortium rights. He is not concerned by the implications for stare decisis in overturning High v. Howard, viewing the prior decision as a 'decision not to decide' and thus not meriting strong precedential value.
Dissenting - Moyer, C.J.
No, the court should not recognize a right for parents to recover for loss of filial consortium, and High v. Howard should not be overturned. Chief Justice Moyer emphasizes the importance of stare decisis for consistency and predictability in law. He criticizes the majority for overturning High v. Howard, a decision made just one year prior and representing the majority view across the country, primarily due to a change in court composition. He argues this undermines the stability of the law. He also disagrees with the rationale of assigning monetary value to intangible losses like a child's love and affection, finding such evaluations inappropriate and out of touch with what truly matters.
Dissenting - Wright, J.
No, the majority improperly overrode recent precedent, misinterpreted existing law, and overstepped its judicial role. Justice Wright argues the majority abused its role by overruling High v. Howard, a case decided only a year ago, primarily due to a change in court personnel rather than changed assumptions or unworkability of the rule. This, he contends, erodes the predictability and integrity of the court's decisions. He asserts that recognizing new causes of action, particularly for intangible losses like consortium, is a matter best left to the legislature, which is better equipped for policy debate. He challenges the majority's claim of 'rediscovering' an existing right, noting the lack of prior explicit recognition and the prospective application of the ruling, indicating a new right is being created. He also criticizes the majority's interpretation of Clark v. Bayer and other precedents as misleading. Wright reiterates policy concerns, including the difficulty of accurately measuring such damages, the risk of juries treating them as punitive, the potential for increased insurance costs, and the arbitrary limitation of such claims to only parents and children when other relatives might have similarly close ties. He concludes that money cannot truly remedy the deep emotional pain of an injury to a child.
Dissenting - Wolff, J.
No, while the concept has merit, the decision to create these new rights should be left to the legislature. Justice Wolff states he dissents but not for all reasons articulated by the other dissenting justices. He concedes that a parental right to recover for loss of filial consortium (and a child's right for parental consortium) might be a 'salutary addition' to the law and that the practical concerns about managing such claims (like measuring damages, preventing double recovery, or limiting the class of claimants) might not be unmanageable. However, he agrees with Justice Wright that the majority is creating new rights, rather than recognizing existing ones. He believes that the General Assembly, not the Supreme Court, is the more appropriate forum for determining whether such new rights of recovery, driven by policy considerations about the special parent-child relationship, should be established in Ohio.
Analysis:
This case represents a significant evolution in Ohio tort law, expanding the scope of recoverable damages beyond purely economic losses to include the intangible emotional and relational value of parent-child relationships. By explicitly defining 'consortium' to include elements like society, companionship, and love for both parents and minor children, the court modernizes a legal area long rooted in an antiquated master-servant paradigm. The direct overruling of a recent precedent (High v. Howard) signals a willingness by the Ohio Supreme Court to engage in more judicial activism to adapt common law to contemporary societal norms, which could have implications for other areas of law perceived as 'out of touch.' This shift reinforces the legal recognition of emotional bonds within families, potentially paving the way for further expansion of relational tort claims or influencing how emotional damages are assessed in other contexts.
