Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State of Florida
210 So. 3d 1243 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Florida Constitution, any law that implicates the fundamental right of privacy is presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny, without requiring the challenger to first make an evidentiary showing that the law imposes a 'significant restriction' on that right.
Facts:
- In 1997, the Florida Legislature enacted the 'Woman’s Right to Know Act,' an informed consent statute specific to abortion procedures.
- In 2015, the Legislature amended this act to create the 'Mandatory Delay Law.'
- The new law required that the state-mandated information be provided to a woman at least 24 hours before she could undergo an abortion procedure.
- This 24-hour waiting period functionally required women to make a second, medically unnecessary trip to their healthcare provider.
- The law did not require any new or different information to be provided to the patient; it only imposed a waiting period after the existing required disclosures were made.
- No other medical procedure in Florida, including gynecological procedures with greater risks than abortion, was subject to a mandatory 24-hour waiting period.
- Gainesville Woman Care, LLC, presented evidence that the delay could force some women past gestational limits for medication abortions, requiring them to undergo more invasive surgical procedures, and could increase health risks for all women by delaying care.
Procedural Posture:
- Gainesville Woman Care, LLC (GWC) and Medical Students for Choice sued the State of Florida in the Second Judicial Circuit Court (a state trial court).
- GWC filed a motion for an emergency temporary injunction to prevent the Mandatory Delay Law from taking effect.
- The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the temporary injunction, finding the law likely violated Florida's constitutional right to privacy.
- The State, as appellant, appealed the trial court's order to the First District Court of Appeal (an intermediate appellate court).
- The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's injunction, ruling that the trial court failed to make sufficient factual findings that the law imposed a 'significant restriction' on abortion access before applying strict scrutiny.
- GWC, as Petitioners, sought review of the First District's decision from the Supreme Court of Florida.
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Issue:
Does a law that imposes a mandatory 24-hour waiting period for abortions implicate Florida's constitutional right of privacy, thereby triggering strict scrutiny review without requiring an initial evidentiary showing that the law imposes a 'significant restriction'?
Opinions:
Majority - Pariente, J.
Yes, a law imposing a mandatory 24-hour waiting period for abortions implicates Florida's constitutional right of privacy and is subject to strict scrutiny without any prerequisite showing of a 'significant restriction.' Florida’s Constitution contains an explicit and broad fundamental right to privacy that is more protective than the implicit right in the U.S. Constitution. Any law that intrudes upon this right is presumptively unconstitutional and must be reviewed under strict scrutiny. This means the State bears the burden of proving the law serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means. The First District Court of Appeal erred by imposing an initial evidentiary burden on the challengers to prove a 'significant restriction' before applying strict scrutiny, which wrongly imports a weaker standard similar to the federal 'undue burden' test that this Court has explicitly rejected. Because the Mandatory Delay Law facially implicates a woman's right to privacy by impeding her ability to effectuate her medical decision, the burden shifted to the State. The State presented no evidence of a compelling interest or that a 24-hour mandatory delay was the least restrictive means to achieve any such interest.
Dissenting - Canady, J.
No, a law regulating abortion should only be subjected to strict scrutiny if the challenger first proves with sufficient factual evidence that the law imposes a 'significant restriction' on that right. The majority misreads this Court's precedent from In re T.W. and North Florida Women’s Health, which explicitly distinguished between 'significant restrictions' that trigger strict scrutiny and 'insignificant burdens' that do not. The First District was correct to require the trial court to make factual findings as to whether the 24-hour delay constituted a significant restriction before applying the highest level of review. Furthermore, the trial court's injunction was procedurally defective because it was not based on competent, substantial evidence. The dissent also argues that enhancing informed consent with a brief period of reflection is a legitimate state goal, given the unique and consequential nature of the abortion decision, and does not automatically 'turn informed consent on its head.'
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the robust nature of Florida's explicit constitutional right to privacy, setting it apart from federal jurisprudence. By rejecting any threshold requirement of a 'significant restriction,' the Court ensures that any legislative attempt to regulate abortion is immediately subject to the highest standard of judicial review, strict scrutiny. This makes it significantly more difficult for the state to enact abortion restrictions, as the burden falls entirely on the state to justify the law's necessity and tailoring. The ruling strongly affirms that Florida's privacy clause provides broader protection than the federal 'undue burden' standard, creating a powerful precedent against future state laws that might impede access to abortion or implicate other privacy interests.
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