Gagnon v. Scarpelli
411 U.S. 778 (1973)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a case-by-case determination of whether an indigent probationer or parolee is entitled to appointed counsel at a revocation hearing. Counsel is not required in every case, but only when fundamental fairness dictates, such as when the probationer presents a colorable claim that they did not commit the violation or when there are complex mitigating circumstances that they are incapable of effectively presenting alone.
Facts:
- In July 1965, Gerald Scarpelli pleaded guilty to armed robbery in Wisconsin and received a 15-year suspended sentence with seven years of probation.
- Scarpelli signed an agreement allowing him to reside in Illinois under the supervision of that state's probation authorities.
- On August 6, 1965, Scarpelli and an associate, Fred Kleckner, Jr., were arrested by Illinois police during a house burglary.
- After being advised of his rights, Scarpelli admitted to participating in the burglary, although he later claimed this admission was made under duress.
- On September 1, 1965, the Wisconsin Department of Public Welfare revoked Scarpelli's probation without a hearing.
- The stated grounds for revocation were that Scarpelli had associated with a known criminal and was involved in and arrested for a burglary.
- Following the revocation, Scarpelli was incarcerated in Wisconsin to begin serving his 15-year prison sentence.
Procedural Posture:
- Gerald Scarpelli filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
- The District Court held that the revocation of Scarpelli's probation without a hearing and counsel was a denial of due process.
- Gagnon, the warden, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that due process required the state to provide counsel in revocation hearings.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to provide an indigent probationer with appointed counsel at a probation revocation hearing?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Powell
No, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state to provide an indigent probationer with appointed counsel in all probation revocation hearings. While due process requires a preliminary and final revocation hearing for probationers, the right to counsel is not absolute and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The court reasoned that probation revocation is not a criminal prosecution like a trial, and the state has a significant interest in maintaining an informal, flexible, and non-adversarial process focused on rehabilitation. The Court distinguished the per se right to counsel established in Gideon v. Wainwright, noting the critical differences between a criminal trial and a revocation hearing. Instead, the revoking authority must exercise its discretion, providing counsel where fundamental fairness—the touchstone of due process—requires it, such as in cases involving complex factual disputes or mitigating circumstances.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas
Yes, due process requires the appointment of counsel in this specific case. The dissent argues that counsel was necessary because of Scarpelli's claim that his confession to the burglary, which formed the basis of his revocation, was made under duress. This factual dispute over the voluntariness of the confession makes the assistance of counsel essential to ensure a fair hearing.
Analysis:
This decision extended the due process hearing requirements from Morrissey v. Brewer (parole revocation) to probation revocation, treating them as constitutionally indistinguishable. However, it notably stopped short of applying the Sixth Amendment's absolute right to counsel from Gideon v. Wainwright to this context. By establishing a flexible, case-by-case standard for appointing counsel, the Court created a balancing test that weighs the probationer's liberty interest against the state's interest in maintaining an informal, rehabilitative administrative process. This case solidifies the principle that post-conviction proceedings afford fewer procedural protections than criminal trials and vests significant discretion in probation and parole authorities.
