Georgia v. Randolph
547 U.S. 103 (2006)
Rule of Law:
A warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable and is invalid as to the objecting resident, even if a co-occupant provides consent.
Facts:
- Scott Randolph and his wife, Janet, were married but had recently separated, with Janet and their son returning to the marital home in Americus, Georgia, after staying with her parents.
- On the morning of July 6, 2001, following a domestic dispute, Janet Randolph complained to the police that her husband had taken their son.
- When officers arrived, Janet told them Scott was a cocaine user. Scott soon returned and denied her allegations, countering that she abused drugs and alcohol.
- Janet Randolph then told Sergeant Murray that there were 'items of drug evidence' in the house.
- Sergeant Murray asked Scott Randolph for permission to search the house, which Scott unequivocally refused.
- Sergeant Murray then turned to Janet Randolph and asked for her consent to search, which she readily gave.
- Janet led the officer to an upstairs bedroom, which she identified as Scott's, where the officer observed a section of a drinking straw with a powdery residue suspected to be cocaine.
Procedural Posture:
- Based on evidence found during the search, Scott Randolph was indicted for possession of cocaine.
- Randolph filed a motion to suppress the evidence in the state trial court, arguing the warrantless search was invalid due to his express refusal of consent.
- The trial court denied the motion, ruling that Janet Randolph had common authority to consent.
- The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the trial court's decision, finding the search invalid.
- The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal, holding that one occupant's consent is not valid in the face of a physically present co-occupant's refusal.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split of authority among federal and state courts.
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Issue:
Does a warrantless search of a shared residence, based on the consent of one occupant, violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures as to a co-occupant who is physically present and expressly refuses consent?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Souter
Yes, such a search is unreasonable and invalid as to the objecting co-occupant. The validity of consent-based searches rests on widely shared social expectations. A visitor would not feel comfortable entering a home if one occupant invited them in while another, standing at the door, ordered them to stay out. Based on this common understanding, a co-occupant's consent does not carry enough authority to override the express objection of another physically present co-occupant. This holding distinguishes previous cases like United States v. Matlock, where the objecting party was absent. The Court draws a 'fine line' where a physically present and objecting co-occupant's refusal is dispositive, but the refusal of a nearby but unaware occupant is not.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Roberts
No, the search is reasonable and should be valid. The core principle of third-party consent is that individuals who share places with others 'assume the risk' that the other person might share access with the government. The majority's rule is based on a guess about 'social expectations' in an atypical situation and creates an arbitrary distinction, protecting a person who happens to be at the front door but not one who is asleep in the next room. This decision will have serious negative consequences, particularly in domestic abuse cases where a victim's consent to police entry could be vetoed by the present abuser, potentially leaving the victim in danger.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
No. Joining the dissent of The Chief Justice, this opinion argues that the practical effect of the majority's ruling will be to give men the power to stop women from allowing police into their homes in domestic violence situations. It also refutes the concurrence's historical analysis, arguing that the Fourth Amendment's meaning is fixed but can refer to evolving bodies of law, like property rights, without its core principle changing. The evolution of women's property rights does not logically lead to the conclusion that a refusing spouse's objection must prevail over a consenting spouse's invitation.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No. This case should be controlled by Coolidge v. New Hampshire, which holds that no Fourth Amendment search occurs when a private citizen voluntarily leads police to evidence. Janet Randolph was not acting as a government agent when she showed Sergeant Murray the straw; she was a private actor. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated by her actions, and the Court did not need to address the third-party consent issue at all.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
Yes. This opinion emphasizes that while historical property law in the 18th century would have given the husband's decision sole authority, modern constitutional law recognizes men and women as equal partners. As equals, neither spouse has the power to override the other's assertion of their constitutional right to deny police entry into their home. Therefore, when one spouse consents and the other objects, the objection must be honored to protect the objector's constitutional right.
Concurring - Justice Breyer
Yes. While a bright-line rule always permitting consent-based searches might serve law enforcement needs, the Fourth Amendment requires an examination of the 'totality of the circumstances.' In this specific case—where the search was solely for evidence, the objector was present and clear, and there were no exigent circumstances—the warrantless search was unreasonable. The holding is case-specific, and the result might be different in other situations, such as when police are responding to domestic abuse and an invitation to enter could reflect a victim's fear.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant, albeit narrow, exception to the third-party consent doctrine under the Fourth Amendment. By creating the 'physically present objector' rule, the Court prioritizes the right of a present co-occupant to refuse a search over the right of another co-occupant to consent. The ruling draws a formalistic line based on whether the objecting individual is at the 'threshold colloquy,' potentially leading to arbitrary outcomes depending on a person's location at the moment police arrive. This creates a clear but potentially rigid rule for law enforcement and may affect how they handle consent requests at shared residences, particularly in domestic dispute contexts.
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