G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States
1977 U.S. LEXIS 33, 50 L. Ed. 2d 530, 429 U.S. 338 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for government agents to enter private premises to conduct a search or seizure, even for the purpose of collecting taxes. While a statute may authorize the seizure of property, it does not grant authority for a warrantless intrusion into a taxpayer's private home or office.
Facts:
- George I. Norman, Jr. was convicted of a federal crime in 1971 and later became a fugitive from justice in March 1973.
- The IRS determined that Norman had significant income tax deficiencies for 1970 and 1971 and made jeopardy assessments against him.
- The IRS concluded that G. M. Leasing Corp., a corporation managed by Norman, was his 'alter ego' and that its assets were actually Norman's personal property.
- IRS agents seized several automobiles registered to G. M. Leasing from public streets and parking lots without a warrant.
- Two days after the initial assessments, IRS agents made a warrantless entry into a cottage that served as G. M. Leasing's office.
- During this entry, the agents forcibly opened locked doors and seized the office's contents, including furnishings, books, and records, to satisfy Norman's tax liability.
Procedural Posture:
- G. M. Leasing Corp. filed suit in the U.S. District Court against individual IRS agents, seeking the return of its property and damages for wrongful levy, alleging the warrantless entry and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.
- The District Court (trial court) ruled in favor of G. M. Leasing, finding the search and seizure illegal and holding that the corporation was not an alter ego of the taxpayer.
- The United States, as respondent, appealed the District Court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that G. M. Leasing was the taxpayer's alter ego and that the warrantless levy and seizure were authorized by statute and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
- G. M. Leasing Corp., as petitioner, sought and was granted a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, limited to the Fourth Amendment issue.
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Issue:
Does a warrantless entry by Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents into the private office of a corporation to seize property in satisfaction of tax assessments violate the Fourth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Blackmun
Yes, a warrantless entry by IRS agents into the private office of a corporation to seize property in satisfaction of tax assessments violates the Fourth Amendment. The court distinguished between the seizure of the automobiles and the entry into the office. The seizure of the cars from public streets and lots was constitutional because it did not involve an invasion of privacy. However, the warrantless entry into the private office constituted a search and seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The Court reasoned that business premises are protected from unreasonable searches and that the governing principle is that a warrantless search of private property is 'unreasonable' unless authorized by a valid warrant or a well-defined exception. The statute authorizing tax levies, § 6331, permits 'seizure by any means' but does not explicitly authorize warrantless intrusions into private premises, and the Court declined to read such an unconstitutional authorization into the statute. Furthermore, the 'exigent circumstances' exception did not apply because the agents' delay of several days before entering the office demonstrated a lack of urgency.
Concurring - Mr. Chief Justice Burger
Yes. While agreeing with the majority's conclusion, this opinion emphasizes that exigent circumstances could have justified a warrantless entry at a specific moment. When the agents observed people moving cartons from the premises surreptitiously at night, an exigency existed that would have permitted an immediate warrantless seizure to prevent the removal of assets. However, the agents' choice to wait for a day and a half to two days after this observation caused the exigency to dissipate. The delay, therefore, made the subsequent warrantless entry unconstitutional, not the absence of a potential emergency.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a critical limitation on the federal government's tax collection authority, clarifying that the power to levy taxes does not override the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. By distinguishing between seizures in public spaces (permissible without a warrant) and intrusions into private premises (requiring a warrant), the Court protected the privacy of homes and businesses from warrantless government entry in civil tax enforcement actions. This precedent reinforces that statutory authority alone is insufficient to create a new exception to the warrant requirement and ensures that IRS agents, like other law enforcement officers, must generally obtain judicial approval before entering private property.
