Fuller v. Oregon
40 L. Ed. 2d 642, 417 U.S. 40, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 55 (1974)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A state may constitutionally require a convicted criminal defendant to repay the costs of their state-provided legal counsel if they later acquire the financial means to do so, provided the recoupment statute has safeguards to prevent hardship and does not discriminate against the indigent.
Facts:
- Fuller was charged with sodomy in Oregon.
- Upon Fuller's representation that he was indigent, the court appointed a lawyer to represent him at state expense.
- Fuller's court-appointed counsel hired an investigator to assist with the defense, the costs of which were also assumed by the state.
- Fuller pleaded guilty to the charge.
- Fuller was sentenced to five years of probation.
- A condition of his probation was that he reimburse the county for the fees of his appointed attorney and the investigator.
- The probation was also conditioned on his participation in a work-release program that would permit him to attend college.
Procedural Posture:
- Fuller pleaded guilty to sodomy in an Oregon state trial court.
- The trial court sentenced Fuller to five years of probation, with a condition that he reimburse the county for the costs of his appointed attorney and investigator.
- Fuller (as appellant) appealed his sentence to the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing the repayment condition was unconstitutional.
- The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's sentence.
- Fuller's petition for review to the Supreme Court of Oregon was denied.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does an Oregon statute that requires a convicted indigent defendant, who subsequently acquires the financial means, to repay the costs of their state-provided legal counsel violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stewart
No, the Oregon statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The law is carefully designed to only impose a repayment obligation on those who become financially capable of paying without hardship. Unlike the statute struck down in James v. Strange, Oregon's law does not strip indigent defendants of the protective exemptions available to other civil judgment debtors. The distinction between requiring repayment from convicted defendants but not from acquitted ones is a rational classification aimed at achieving elemental fairness. Furthermore, the statute does not 'chill' the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because legal representation is provided to all indigents when they need it, and the potential future obligation to repay does not affect their eligibility for counsel at the time of the proceedings.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes, the Oregon recoupment statute violates the Equal Protection Clause. The statute provides unequal treatment between indigent defendants and other civil judgment debtors in a fundamental respect: an indigent defendant's failure to pay their debt for legal services can result in imprisonment through probation revocation. In contrast, a nonindigent defendant who fails to pay their privately retained counsel cannot be imprisoned for that debt under Oregon's constitution. This disparity imposes an unduly harsh and discriminatory term on indigent defendants simply because their obligation is to the public treasury, which is precisely the kind of discrimination prohibited by James v. Strange.
Concurring - Justice Douglas
No, the statute as narrowly construed by the Oregon courts is constitutional. The state court interpreted the law to mean that repayment is only required when a defendant is no longer indigent, and probation can only be revoked for a willful, 'contumacious' default where payment would not cause hardship. This narrow construction eliminates any 'chill' on the right to counsel. The dissent's argument concerning imprisonment for debt under the Oregon Constitution was not properly raised or preserved in the lower courts and is therefore not before this Court for consideration. Ruling on that issue would be an improper advisory opinion on a matter of state law.
Analysis:
This decision validates state recoupment statutes, giving states a constitutional framework for recovering the costs of indigent defense. It clarifies the scope of James v. Strange, holding that such statutes are permissible as long as they do not strip indigent defendants of the same protections afforded to other civil debtors and include safeguards based on ability to pay. The case establishes that the state's interest in recovering public funds can be balanced against an indigent defendant's rights, provided the system is fundamentally fair and non-discriminatory. This precedent encourages states to implement similar cost-recovery programs, potentially affecting the financial dynamics of public defense systems nationwide.
