Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools
197 L. Ed. 2d 46, 137 S.Ct. 743, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 1427 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff is not required to exhaust the administrative procedures of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) before filing a lawsuit under other federal anti-discrimination laws if the gravamen of the suit is something other than the denial of a 'free appropriate public education' (FAPE).
Facts:
- E.F. is a child with a severe form of cerebral palsy which significantly limits her motor skills and mobility.
- At her pediatrician's recommendation, E.F.'s parents, the Frys, obtained a trained service dog named Wonder to help E.F. with various life activities and increase her independence.
- When the Frys requested that Wonder be allowed to accompany E.F. to kindergarten at Ezra Eby Elementary School, school officials refused.
- School officials reasoned that because E.F.'s Individualized Education Program (IEP) already provided for a one-on-one human aide, all her needs were being met and the service dog was superfluous.
- The school briefly permitted Wonder to attend on a trial basis but severely restricted his functions, requiring him to stay in the back of the room and forbidding him from assisting E.F. with trained tasks.
- After the trial period, school administrators again barred Wonder from the school.
- As a result of the school's refusal to accommodate Wonder, the Frys removed E.F. from the school and began homeschooling her.
- Even after school officials eventually relented, the Frys, concerned about potential resentment, enrolled E.F. in a different public school that welcomed both her and Wonder.
Procedural Posture:
- The Frys filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which determined the school district had violated the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
- The Frys sued the school districts and the school principal in the U.S. District Court, alleging violations of Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
- The District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the suit, holding that § 1415(l) of the IDEA required the Frys to first exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures.
- The Frys, as appellants, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
- A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal, agreeing that exhaustion of IDEA procedures was required.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the issue.
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Issue:
Does the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) require a plaintiff to exhaust its administrative procedures before filing a lawsuit under other federal anti-discrimination laws, like the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, when the lawsuit's gravamen is not the denial of a 'free appropriate public education' (FAPE)?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kagan
No, the IDEA's exhaustion requirement does not apply when the gravamen of the plaintiff's suit is something other than the denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The IDEA's exhaustion provision in § 1415(l) applies only when a suit seeks 'relief that is also available under' the IDEA. The only substantive relief an IDEA administrative hearing officer can provide is for the denial of a FAPE. Therefore, if a suit does not seek relief for a FAPE denial, there is no relief 'available' under the IDEA, and exhaustion is not required. To determine if a suit's gravamen concerns a FAPE denial, courts must look at the substance of the complaint, not just its labels. A court can ask hypothetical questions as clues: could the plaintiff have brought the same claim if the conduct occurred at a non-school public facility, and could an adult at the school have pressed the same grievance? If yes, the suit is likely about general discrimination rather than a FAPE denial. The Sixth Circuit erred by applying a broader test of whether the harm was 'educational' in nature. The case is vacated and remanded for the lower court to determine the gravamen of the Frys' complaint using this proper analysis.
Concurring - Justice Alito
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment and most of the opinion but disagreed with the majority's suggested 'clues' for lower courts. He argued that the hypothetical questions and the consideration of whether a plaintiff previously used IDEA procedures are 'misleading' and 'likely to confuse.' He reasoned that there is often an overlap between relief available under the IDEA and other statutes, which undermines the utility of the hypothetical questions. Furthermore, parents might begin an IDEA process and then realize their desired relief is only available under a different law, so abandoning the IDEA process is not necessarily proof that the suit's gravamen is a FAPE denial.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of the IDEA's exhaustion requirement, resolving a split among the circuit courts. By rejecting a broad 'educational nexus' test and establishing a more precise 'gravamen of the complaint' standard focused on the denial of a FAPE, the Court empowers plaintiffs to bring certain disability discrimination claims directly to court. This holding prevents the IDEA's procedural requirements from becoming a barrier to vindicating rights, such as equal access, that are protected by other statutes like the ADA. The two-question 'clue' provides a practical framework for lower courts to distinguish between suits that are fundamentally about education and those that are about broader civil rights, potentially expediting relief for non-FAPE-related discrimination in schools.
