Fried v. Archer
139 Md. App. 229, 775 A.2d 430, 2001 Md. App. LEXIS 114 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
A police dispatcher does not owe a private 'special duty' of care to an individual victim unless the victim, or a third party calling on their behalf, detrimentally and justifiably relied on the dispatcher's affirmative promise of assistance.
Facts:
- Fifteen-year-old Tiffany Fouts became intoxicated and semi-conscious at a residence at 1443 Charleston Drive, K Court, in Edgewood, where she was visiting with friends and new acquaintances.
- Some of the guests sexually assaulted and abused Tiffany, including dropping heavy objects on her head and urinating on her.
- Eric F. and Ricky dragged Tiffany, clad only in light clothing, out a back door and left her in an area of woods directly behind the townhome in cold, rainy weather.
- Donte, Eric, and Ricky, aware Tiffany was in danger from exposure, called the Harford County Sheriff's Department (HCSO) for help.
- During the call, Donte, at Eric's instruction, provided police communications officer Kim Archer with a fictitious street number ("1436") and address ("Harford Square, K Court") and insisted on anonymity to prevent police from coming to their actual location.
- Archer told the caller, "Okay. We'll send someone out."
- The callers made only one brief check on Tiffany after the call and then abandoned plans to bring her inside when Eric's mother intervened, making no further efforts to aid her or recontact police.
- Tiffany lay in the woods behind K Court until she was found the next day, dead from hypothermia.
Procedural Posture:
- Sarah Fried (appellant) filed a wrongful death and survival action against Ms. F., PCO Archer (appellee), unidentified dispatch or emergency service employees ("Doe defendants"), Officer Thomas, Chief Terrell (appellee), the Harford County Sheriff's Department (HCSO), and the State.
- Appellant voluntarily dismissed Ms. F. from the lawsuit.
- All governmental defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the negligence claims against them.
- Appellant voluntarily dismissed Officer Thomas from the suit.
- On November 16, 1999, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion and order dismissing Archer, Terrell, the Doe defendants, and the State, ruling that there was no existing duty to the victim, thus Archer and Terrell could not be negligent.
- Appellant filed an appeal challenging only the dismissal of her claims against Archer and Terrell.
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Issue:
Does a police dispatcher owe a 'special duty' of care to an unconscious individual victim when third parties, who were involved in imperiling the victim, request emergency assistance but intentionally provide inaccurate information and then abandon their own rescue efforts, such that the victim or the third parties justifiably and detrimentally relied on the dispatcher's promise of assistance?
Opinions:
Majority - Adkins, Judge
No, police dispatcher Kim Archer did not owe a special duty to rescue Tiffany Fouts, because Tiffany, being unconscious, could not specifically rely on Archer's promise, and the assailants who called on her behalf did not justifiably rely on that promise. The Court reaffirms the general rule that there is no affirmative legal duty to rescue someone in peril, but recognizes an exception when a 'special relationship' exists. This special relationship arises from the victim's justifiable reliance on an expectation of assistance, and applies to public servants like police dispatchers on a case-by-case basis. To establish a special relationship, there must be an 'affirmative act plus specific reliance,' with specific reliance requiring it to be both detrimental and justifiable. Tiffany, being unconscious, could not have been aware of Archer's promise and therefore could not have detrimentally relied on it. The Court assumed, without deciding, that third-party detrimental reliance could potentially create a special duty, but concluded that in this case, the callers' reliance was not justifiable. The callers intentionally provided inaccurate and incomplete information (a fictitious address, and omitted critical details about Tiffany's condition and the assault) and then permanently abandoned their own nondelegable duty to rescue Tiffany. Archer's promise to send an officer to a fictitious address did not increase Tiffany's peril by depriving her of assistance that could reasonably have been expected from the third parties, as they failed to correct information or resume efforts. The Court emphasizes public policy concerns about imposing 'unbounded and disproportionate liability' on public services and clarifies that the 'no special duty' defense is a fundamental tort doctrine related to the 'duty' element of negligence, applicable to all defendants (public or private) and not abrogated by the Local Government Tort Claims Act.
Analysis:
This case is a crucial clarification in Maryland tort law, specifically regarding the negligence liability of police dispatchers and public safety personnel. It firmly establishes that the 'special duty rule' applies to dispatchers, mirroring its application to responding officers, and reinforces the high bar for establishing a private duty of care to an individual, particularly the stringent requirements of 'detrimental and justifiable reliance.' The ruling significantly narrows the circumstances under which public safety agencies can be held liable for failure to rescue, especially when callers provide false information or cease their own efforts. It underscores the judiciary's caution in expanding tort liability against public entities, balancing potential individual claims with the broader societal impact on governmental resources and service provision.
