Frendak v. United States
1979 D.C. App. LEXIS 463, 408 A.2d 364 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
A trial judge may not impose an insanity defense over the objection of a defendant who has been found competent to stand trial, provided the defendant's decision to forgo the defense is made intelligently and voluntarily. A finding of competency to stand trial is insufficient on its own to establish the capacity to waive the defense; the court must conduct a separate inquiry into the matter.
Facts:
- Paula Frendak and Willard Titlow were co-workers.
- On three occasions prior to January 15, 1974, Frendak followed Titlow and another co-worker.
- On the day of the murder, Frendak followed Titlow and a colleague as they went to lunch, waited for them to return, and then followed them up the elevator.
- Frendak told a secretary she was leaving for an appointment with her lawyer and immediately followed Titlow out of their seventh-floor office.
- Minutes later, Titlow was discovered fatally shot with two bullets in the first-floor hallway of the building.
- Frendak fled the United States, traveling through multiple countries before being arrested in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.
- A search of Frendak's baggage in Abu Dhabi revealed a .38 caliber pistol, which ballistics tests later confirmed was the murder weapon.
- Frendak testified that she was in the hallway to sell the gun to Titlow when an unknown woman appeared, grabbed the gun, shot Titlow, and fled.
Procedural Posture:
- Paula Frendak was indicted in the trial court for first-degree murder and carrying a pistol without a license.
- The trial court conducted four competency hearings, after which it found Frendak competent to stand trial.
- At the trial on the merits, Frendak did not raise an insanity defense.
- The jury returned a verdict finding Frendak guilty on both counts.
- After the verdict, the trial judge held a hearing and decided, over Frendak's objection, to interpose an insanity defense on her behalf.
- A second phase of the trial on the issue of insanity was held before the same jury.
- The jury found Frendak not guilty by reason of insanity.
- Frendak appealed this verdict to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court erred by forcing the insanity defense upon her.
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Issue:
May a trial judge impose an insanity defense over the objection of a defendant found competent to stand trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Ferren, J.
No, a trial judge may not force an insanity defense on a defendant found competent to stand trial if the individual intelligently and voluntarily decides to forego that defense. The court reinterprets the rule from Whalem v. United States, finding the philosophies of Faretta v. California and North Carolina v. Alford, which emphasize a defendant's autonomy in making fundamental decisions about their defense, to be more compelling. Defendants may have valid strategic, personal, or political reasons for rejecting an insanity defense, such as avoiding the stigma of mental illness or the prospect of indefinite civil commitment which could exceed a prison sentence. Because the defendant must bear the consequences of the decision, their choice must be respected. However, the court must first conduct a specific inquiry to ensure the waiver is intelligent and voluntary, as a finding of competency to stand trial under Dusky is not sufficient for this purpose. The case is remanded for the trial court to determine if Frendak's waiver met this standard.
Concurring - Kern, J.
No, the court must respect the choice of a defendant capable of voluntarily and intelligently making that choice. This opinion agrees with the majority's accommodation of Whalem with Alford and Faretta, stating that it strikes a proper balance between protecting a mentally irresponsible defendant and permitting a capable defendant to decide their own fate. The concurrence explicitly supports the majority's conclusion that competency to stand trial is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate the capacity to waive the insanity defense. A remand is necessary because the trial judge expressed reservations about Frendak's ability to fully appreciate the consequences of her decision, and a specific finding on the waiver's validity is required.
Concurring - Gallagher, J.
No, but this conclusion could be reached under the existing legal framework without reinterpreting Whalem. This opinion argues that Faretta and Alford do not fundamentally undermine Whalem, which concerns society's moral judgment not to punish the legally insane. The existing flexible standard from Whalem and its progeny, such as United States v. Robertson, already accounts for the defendant's wishes as one factor in the trial court's discretionary decision. The criteria developed in subsequent cases provide a sensible, workable framework for balancing the evidence of insanity against the defendant's reasons for rejecting the defense. Therefore, while concurring in the result to remand the case for a more thorough inquiry, this opinion views the majority's formal reinterpretation of Whalem as unnecessary.
Analysis:
This decision significantly shifts the balance of power from the trial judge to the defendant in cases involving a potential insanity defense. It elevates the defendant's autonomy to control their own defense, grounded in the principles of Faretta and Alford, over the paternalistic interest of the state in not punishing the morally blameless. The case establishes a new procedural requirement for trial courts: a specific judicial inquiry, beyond the standard competency hearing, to validate a defendant's waiver of the insanity defense. This precedent forces courts to respect a defendant's strategic choice to risk a criminal conviction and prison sentence rather than face the stigma and potentially longer confinement of an insanity acquittal.
