Freeman v. City of Pasadena
31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 187, 744 S.W.2d 923, 1988 Tex. LEXIS 4 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff may not recover damages for mental anguish as a bystander to an accident if the plaintiff did not have a sensory and contemporaneous observance of the injury-causing event, but instead learned of the accident from others after its occurrence.
Facts:
- John Freeman was the stepfather to two boys, having raised them since one was four years old and sharing a close father-son relationship.
- Freeman's two stepsons were involved in an automobile accident.
- At the time of the accident, Freeman was at his home, away from the scene.
- An unidentified person rang Freeman's doorbell and informed him that his stepsons had been in an accident.
- Freeman hurried to the scene where he saw one stepson on a gurney, covered in blood, inside an ambulance.
- He learned that his other stepson had already been transported by helicopter to a hospital, where that stepson later died.
Procedural Posture:
- John Freeman sued the City of Pasadena in a Texas trial court seeking damages for, among other things, his own mental anguish.
- Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Freeman, and the trial court entered a judgment awarding him damages.
- The City of Pasadena, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Texas court of appeals.
- The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision and rendered a take-nothing judgment against Freeman.
- Freeman, as petitioner, then brought the case to the Supreme Court of Texas for review.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff have a valid claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander if they did not personally and contemporaneously witness the accident that injured a close relative, but instead learned of it shortly after and arrived at the scene?
Opinions:
Majority - Kilgarlin, Justice
No. A plaintiff cannot recover for mental anguish as a bystander without contemporaneously perceiving the accident. The court formally adopts the foreseeability factors from Dillon v. Legg to determine whether a defendant owes a duty of due care to a bystander. These factors include: (1) proximity to the scene, (2) whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, and (3) whether the plaintiff and victim were closely related. In this case, Freeman's shock resulted from learning of the accident from a third party, not from observing it. Because Freeman did not contemporaneously perceive the accident, he cannot be considered a bystander, and the harm to him was not legally foreseeable.
Concurring - Ray, Justice
No. The majority is correct that recovery is barred because Freeman did not contemporaneously perceive the accident. However, it is important to clarify that the court of appeals erred in suggesting that Freeman's status as a stepparent, rather than a biological parent, would also bar recovery. The third Dillon factor requires a 'close relationship,' which is determined by the emotional attachment between the parties, not their legal or biological status. A jury should be allowed to determine if a relationship, like the close father-son bond between Freeman and his stepsons, satisfies this requirement. To deny recovery based on a lack of blood relation is arbitrary and ignores the reality of modern family structures.
Analysis:
This decision formally adopts the influential Dillon v. Legg test for bystander recovery in Texas, making 'sensory and contemporaneous observance' a firm prerequisite for such claims. It establishes a clear line preventing the expansion of liability to those who suffer emotional distress after hearing about an injury rather than witnessing it. The concurrence is also legally significant because it strongly signals that the 'closely related' element should be interpreted based on the substantive nature of the relationship, not merely biological or legal ties, which preserved the possibility for non-traditional family members to recover in future cases if they met the observance requirement.
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