Franklin v. Portland Community College
100 Or. App. 465, 787 P.2d 489 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
An intentional interference with an economic relationship (IIER) claim requires direct injury to the contractual relationship itself, such as a breach or making obligations more onerous, not merely indirect consequences like the use of accrued sick leave; however, an intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim can be stated if a plaintiff alleges specific intent to cause severe emotional distress and conduct that constitutes an extraordinary transgression of socially tolerable behavior, particularly when involving racial epithets and physical acts in a pattern of harassment.
Facts:
- Plaintiff, a black man, had been a full-time permanent employee of Portland Community College (PCC) since 1984.
- Defendant Hankins was Plaintiff's supervisor at PCC during the period relevant to the dispute.
- On October 17, 1985, Plaintiff filed a grievance against Hankins.
- The grievance was settled in February 1986.
- From October 17, 1985, through January 10, 1988, Hankins engaged in a 'continuing pattern of discrimination and retaliation' toward Plaintiff.
- This pattern included Hankins issuing false reprimands, shoving Plaintiff, using the racial epithet 'boy,' failing to recommend training, attempting to lock Plaintiff in Hankins' office, and suggesting Plaintiff apply for a job at another employer.
- Hankins' conduct caused Plaintiff to experience stress, which resulted in Plaintiff taking a total of 280.5 hours of paid sick leave.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Portland Community College (PCC) and Hankins in a trial court (court of first instance).
- Plaintiff asserted claims for intentional interference with an economic relationship (against Hankins) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (against PCC and Hankins).
- Defendants filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff's first amended complaint for failure to state claims under ORCP 21A(8).
- The trial court granted defendants' motions, dismissing Plaintiff's claims.
- Plaintiff, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Oregon Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
1) Does a plaintiff's use of accrued sick leave due to a supervisor's harassing conduct constitute a sufficient injury to an employment contract to state a claim for intentional interference with an economic relationship? 2) Does a complaint alleging a supervisor's pattern of discrimination and retaliation, including false reprimands, physical shoving, and the use of a racial epithet, state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, specifically regarding the elements of specific intent and 'extraordinary transgression of socially tolerable conduct'?
Opinions:
Majority - Graber, P. J.
No, the use of accrued sick leave does not constitute a sufficient injury to an employment contract to state a claim for intentional interference with an economic relationship. Yes, the alleged pattern of discrimination and retaliation, including racial epithets and physical acts, does state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the intentional interference with an economic relationship claim asserted only against Hankins, the court affirmed dismissal because Plaintiff failed to allege an actual injury to his employment contract. The mere use of sick leave due to stress, without alleging that Hankins' actions caused PCC to withhold or reduce any contractual benefits or made Plaintiff's contractual obligations more onerous, does not meet the requisite injury to the economic relationship itself, as established in precedents like Lewis v. Oregon Beauty Supply Co. and American Sanitary Service v. Walker. For the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against both defendants, the court reversed dismissal. The allegations of a 'continuing pattern of discrimination and retaliation,' including verbal and physical harassment over an extended period, were sufficient to infer Hankins' specific intent to cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress, similar to Palmer v. Bi-Mart Company. While isolated acts like false reprimands or denying training alone are not 'extraordinary transgression' (Snyder v. Sunshine Dairy), the additional allegations of using the racial epithet 'boy' (which the complaint explained is especially offensive to a black man) and physical acts like shoving Plaintiff and attempting to lock him in a room, when considered as a whole, describe 'an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct.' The court also clarified, referencing Sheets v. Knight and Hall v. The May Dept. Stores, that the employment relationship does not lower the requisite level of specific intent for IIED to mere reckless disregard, emphasizing the need for intent 'to do the painful act with knowledge that it will cause grave distress.'
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Riggs, J.
Yes, the use of accrued sick leave does constitute a sufficient injury to an employment contract to state a claim for intentional interference with an economic relationship. Yes, the alleged pattern of harassment states a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the employment relationship should permit a lower requisite level of intent. Justice Riggs concurred with the majority's decision that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim should proceed, agreeing that specific intent could be inferred and the alleged conduct was sufficiently outrageous to meet the 'extraordinary transgression' standard. However, Justice Riggs dissented from the affirmance of the dismissal of the intentional interference with an economic relationship claim. He argued that Plaintiff’s use of 280.5 hours of sick leave constituted a sufficient injury because sick leave is part of contractual compensation. Its use means it is no longer available if needed, thus making the performance of the employment contract 'less valuable' and 'more difficult,' which should satisfy the injury requirement under American Sanitary Service v. Walker. Furthermore, Justice Riggs disagreed with the majority's refusal to consider Plaintiff's assertion that the employment relationship creates a 'special relationship' that should lower the requisite level of intent for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Citing Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc. and Hall v. The May Dept. Stores, he contended that in such relationships, proof that the defendant acted 'with reckless disregard for the consequences of his conduct on plaintiff' should be sufficient, rather than requiring specific intent to cause severe distress, arguing that Patton v. J. C. Penney Co. and Sheets v. Knight did not explicitly overrule Hall's position on this point.
Analysis:
This case offers crucial distinctions between two significant tort claims in the employment context. It clarifies that proving intentional interference with an economic relationship demands a direct, tangible injury to the contractual terms or benefits, setting a stringent standard that mere indirect consequences like the utilization of accrued benefits may not satisfy. Conversely, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the case reinforces the necessity of specific intent and conduct that is truly 'outrageous,' underscoring that a sustained pattern of racially motivated abuse and physical intimidation can meet this high bar, even when lesser acts would not. The dissenting opinion highlights an ongoing jurisprudential debate within Oregon courts concerning the precise intent required for IIED in special relationships like employment, yet the majority's opinion firmly reaffirms the preference for a stricter 'specific intent' standard, which is vital for legal practitioners and future plaintiffs to consider when pleading such claims.
