Franklin v. Johnston
179 Wash. 2d 179, 314 P.3d 373 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
A person's status as a licensed foster parent does not create an absolute bar to establishing de facto parentage, and a court may consider facts that arose during the foster placement when determining whether the requirements for de facto parentage have been met.
Facts:
- Mary Franklin and Jackie Johnston began an on-again, off-again relationship around 2002.
- While separated from Franklin and using drugs, Johnston became pregnant. She then contacted Franklin for help, and they decided to parent the child together.
- Johnston's son, A.F.J., was born while she was in a perinatal treatment program; he was given both Franklin's and Johnston's surnames.
- After A.F.J.'s birth, Johnston and the baby moved in with Franklin, but Johnston relapsed soon after.
- Franklin found Johnston passed out with drug paraphernalia and called Child Protective Services (CPS), which placed A.F.J. in protective custody.
- At a subsequent hearing, Johnston requested that A.F.J. be placed with Franklin.
- A.F.J. was returned to Franklin's home on the condition that she become a licensed foster parent for him.
- For the next two years, Johnston continued to struggle with addiction, entering multiple treatment programs and jail, while Franklin cared for A.F.J.
Procedural Posture:
- The Department of Social and Health Services filed a petition in dependency court to terminate Jackie Johnston's parental rights.
- Mary Franklin filed a nonparental custody petition and a petition for a de facto parentage declaration in the trial court.
- A trial court commissioner found adequate cause for Franklin's petitions to proceed.
- Following a trial, the trial court judge dismissed the nonparental custody petition but granted the petition for de facto parentage, finding Franklin had met her burden of proof.
- Both Franklin and Johnston appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling finding Franklin to be a de facto parent.
- Johnston (petitioner) sought and was granted review by the Supreme Court of Washington.
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Issue:
Does a person's status as a licensed foster parent create a categorical bar to establishing de facto parentage under the four-part L.B. test?
Opinions:
Majority - González, J.
No. A person’s status as a foster parent does not necessarily bar recognition as a de facto parent. The existing four-part test from In re Parentage of L.B. provides sufficient safeguards against disrupting the foster care system. Specifically, the requirements that the legal parent 'consented to and fostered the parent-like relationship' and that the petitioner 'assumed obligations of parenthood without expectation of financial compensation' inherently limit the doctrine's application to foster parents. In this case, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Johnston consented to and fostered the parental relationship before any state involvement, and that Franklin only accepted foster payments because she was required to and initially tried to refuse them. Therefore, the trial court correctly found Franklin to be A.F.J.'s de facto parent.
Dissenting - C. Johnson, J.
Yes. The majority's new rule too broadly applies the de facto parent doctrine, expanding it far beyond its narrow equitable foundation in L.B. The relationship between Franklin and Johnston was unstable and not the long-term, committed partnership seen in L.B. Johnston's 'consent' to Franklin's parental role was not genuine, but rather a product of her vulnerability due to addiction and the coercive pressure of the dependency proceedings. A parent threatened with losing her child has little choice but to agree to placement with a known person, and this should not be used to later deprive her of her parental rights.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Madsen, C.J.
Yes. I agree with the dissent that the majority's rule is far too broad and expands the de facto parent doctrine beyond its foundation. The majority's approach unconstitutionally infringes on Johnston's fundamental parental rights to the care, custody, and control of her child. The majority's reasoning—that conferring de facto parent status makes the action constitutional because Franklin becomes a parent with equal rights—is circular and fails to protect the precious and fundamental rights of a natural parent.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the de facto parentage doctrine is a flexible, equitable remedy that is not automatically defeated by a petitioner's official status as a foster parent. By rejecting a categorical bar, the court empowers trial judges to conduct a fact-specific inquiry into the entire history of the relationships involved. The ruling establishes that the pre-existing relationship and the natural parent's consent before state intervention are critical factors. This will likely impact future dependency cases where relatives or partners become licensed foster parents, reinforcing that while the path to de facto parentage is not closed, the bar remains very high, especially on the elements of consent and lack of expectation for compensation.
