Frank Diehl Farms v. Secretary of Labor
696 F.2d 1325, 11 BNA OSHC 1129, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 30810 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) only grants the Secretary of Labor jurisdiction to regulate employer-provided housing if residency in that housing is a “condition of employment,” meaning it is either explicitly required by the employer or is a practical necessity for the employee.
Facts:
- Frank Diehl Farms, Diehl & Lee, Villemaire Farms, Inc., and V.V. Vogel & Sons Farms, Inc. are four farmers in Hillsborough County, Florida, who employ seasonal workers.
- These farmers provide housing to their seasonal workers on a voluntary basis at little or no cost.
- Workers are not explicitly or implicitly required to live in the employer-provided housing, and some workers choose not to utilize it.
- The housing is not essential for maintaining a stable labor force, as there is an ample labor supply, and the housing facilities are not filled to capacity even during peak harvest season.
- When work is available, housed workers are required to work on the farm providing the housing.
- However, housed workers may continue to use the housing while working for other employers during times when no work is available on the providing farm.
- All parties agree that the workers' occupancy of the provided housing is not a 'condition of employment' but is 'directly related to employment'.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1971, acting under the authority of section 6(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Secretary of Labor adopted Standard Z4.4-1968 of the American National Standards Institution (ANSI) as a consensus standard for temporary labor camps.
- In September 1974, the Secretary published a proposed new housing standard, stating its jurisdictional purpose was to apply to housing that constitutes a “condition of employment.”
- In 1976, after hearings, the Secretary withdrew the proposed new standard, stating that OSHA would continue to inspect temporary labor camps and enforce its existing standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.142, applying a “condition of employment” test.
- Ten days after withdrawing the proposed regulation, the Secretary issued Field Information Memorandum No. 76-17, which instructed field inspectors to apply a “condition of employment” test for migrant housing facilities.
- On June 15, 1979, OSHA issued Instruction CPL 2.37, which replaced the previous field memorandum and rejected the “condition of employment” test in favor of a “directly related to employment” standard.
- Following the adoption of the new “directly related to employment” standard, OSHA issued citations against Frank Diehl Farms, Diehl & Lee, Villemaire Farms, Inc., and V.V. Vogel & Sons Farms, Inc. for violations of 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.142f and 1903(1) regarding their migrant housing facilities.
- An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that the “directly related to employment” test was the correct standard and accordingly held that the temporary housing was a “workplace” within the meaning of the Act, finding the petitioners in violation.
- Because no member of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) directed review, the ALJ’s decision became a final order.
- Petitioners (Frank Diehl Farms et al.) sought review of the OSHRC’s final order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Occupational Safety and Health Act grant the Secretary of Labor statutory authority to regulate employer-provided housing for seasonal farm workers when such housing is not a contractual or practical “condition of employment” but is merely “directly related to employment”?
Opinions:
Majority - Vance, Circuit Judge
No, OSHA does not have statutory authority to regulate employer-provided housing for seasonal farm workers unless residency in that housing is a condition of employment. The court granted less deference to the Secretary of Labor's recent interpretation because it marked a significant departure from the agency's previous longstanding interpretation and enforcement practice without demonstrating a “detailed and comprehensive process” for such a reversal, as required by precedents like General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. As a matter of statutory construction, the court held that the term “workplace” in the Occupational Safety and Health Act should be given its ordinary, common sense meaning, which connotes the place where one must be in order to do his job. The legislative history repeatedly indicates Congress's central concern was avoidance of hazards at the place where work is performed. While the Act is remedial and should be construed liberally, OSHA does not possess a general mandate to solve America's housing ills. For the Act's coverage to extend to an area, the conditions must be considered “working conditions,” the hazards “occupational,” and the injuries “work-related.” The court found that the “condition of employment” standard best reflects this concern, drawing parallels to worker's compensation law where residence-related injuries are compensable only if residency is formally required or a practical necessity. The court concluded that only when company policy or practical necessity forces workers to live in employer-provided housing is the degree of coercion sufficient to link the residence to the workplace for purposes of OSHA jurisdiction.
Dissenting - Johnson, Circuit Judge
Yes, the “directly related to employment” standard is within OSHA’s statutory authority and should be upheld. While acknowledging that the agency's current interpretation might not be entitled to the highest deference due to its recent change, the dissenting judge argued that it is consistent with the language and policy of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The Act's purpose, stated in Section 2(b), is “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions,” and Section 2(a) speaks of “work situations.” The Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall declared the Act to be remedial and deserving of liberal construction. Given that the farmers' operations depend on migrant workers, and the provision of housing at little or no cost helps assure an available labor supply, the camps are an intrinsic part of the “work situation” or “working conditions.” Therefore, OSHA has the authority and duty to regulate conditions in labor camps when the operation of the camp is directly related to the employment of its occupants, and since the employers agreed that the housing met this standard, the citations should be enforced.
Analysis:
This case significantly narrows the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's jurisdictional reach over employer-provided housing, establishing a clear “condition of employment” test. It highlights the judiciary's role in statutory interpretation, particularly when an agency’s evolving interpretations conflict with its past practices, underscoring that agencies must demonstrate a rigorous process for policy reversals to earn deference. The ruling reinforces that OSHA's mandate is primarily focused on hazards directly tied to the performance of work, rather than general living conditions, thereby limiting its ability to address broader social issues like substandard housing for vulnerable populations unless a direct employment link exists. Future cases will need to carefully apply the “condition of employment” test, assessing whether workers are genuinely compelled to reside in employer-provided housing.
