Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc.
992 F.3d 67 (2021)
Rule of Law:
A landlord cannot be presumed to have the degree of control over tenants necessary to impose liability under the Fair Housing Act for tenant-on-tenant harassment, nor does the typical landlord-tenant relationship support a claim of intentional discrimination based solely on a failure to intervene.
Facts:
- Plaintiff Donahue Francis, an African American man, rented an apartment at the Kings Park Manor complex.
- Between February and September 2012, Francis's neighbor, Raymond Endres, subjected Francis to a campaign of racial harassment, including the use of racial slurs (e.g., 'n-word') and death threats.
- Francis reported the conduct to the police, who investigated and eventually arrested Endres for aggravated harassment.
- Francis sent three certified letters to the property management company (KPM) and the property manager (Downing) detailing the racial harassment and police involvement.
- Despite receiving these reports, KPM and Downing did not investigate the complaints or take any action against Endres.
- The owners of KPM explicitly instructed the property manager 'not to get involved' in the dispute.
- Endres eventually vacated his apartment when his lease expired, several months after the arrest.
Procedural Posture:
- Francis filed a complaint against KPM, Downing, and Endres in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
- The KPM Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
- The District Court granted the motion and dismissed Francis's claims against the KPM Defendants.
- Francis appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Second Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal, reinstating the claims.
- The Second Circuit ordered a rehearing en banc (a hearing before the full court) to reconsider the panel's decision.
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Issue:
Does a landlord's failure to intervene in known tenant-on-tenant racial harassment constitute intentional discrimination under the Fair Housing Act based on a theory of deliberate indifference?
Opinions:
Majority - Cabranes
No, a landlord's failure to respond to tenant-on-tenant harassment does not state a claim for intentional discrimination under the FHA because landlords lack substantial control over tenants. The Court held that to succeed on a 'deliberate indifference' theory, a plaintiff must show the defendant had substantial control over both the harasser and the context. Unlike schools or prisons (custodial environments), the relationship between a landlord and tenant is an arms-length transaction between free adults. The Court ruled that the power to evict does not equate to the 'substantial control' required for liability. Furthermore, Francis failed to provide factual allegations that KPM's inaction was motivated by racial animus, such as evidence that they intervened in similar non-racial disputes for white tenants. Finally, because the police were involved and handling the criminal conduct, the landlord's inaction was not 'clearly unreasonable.'
Dissenting - Chin
No, the dismissal should not be affirmed because the Court is applying inconsistent pleading standards. Judge Chin argued that the Court granted en banc review in this case to heighten the pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs, while denying review in other cases (like Mandala) where plaintiffs were also held to an unfairly high standard. He emphasized that at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court should draw inferences in favor of the plaintiff (that the landlord had control via the lease terms) rather than against him.
Dissenting - Lohier
Yes, the complaint plausibly alleged intentional discrimination because the FHA covers post-acquisition conduct and the landlord had the power to intervene. Judge Lohier argued that the FHA was intended to be broad and covers conduct occurring after a lease is signed. He asserted that Francis met the minimal pleading burden by alleging KPM had the authority to evict or discipline Endres under the lease terms, satisfying the 'substantial control' element. The dissent argued that deliberately ignoring a known, extended campaign of racial terror by a tenant constitutes intentional discrimination and that the majority improperly prioritized policy concerns about landlord liability over the text of the civil rights statutes.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limits the scope of landlord liability under the Fair Housing Act within the Second Circuit. By rejecting the 'deliberate indifference' theory in the context of typical landlord-tenant relationships, the Court distinguishes housing from educational (Title IX) or employment (Title VII) contexts, establishing that landlords are not expected to police the social interactions or criminal behavior of tenants. This ruling creates a split in approach with the Seventh Circuit (which allowed a similar claim in Wetzel), though the Second Circuit distinguished Wetzel based on the specific degree of control present in that assisted-living facility case. Practically, this protects landlords from becoming de facto law enforcement but leaves tenants with fewer remedies against landlords who ignore hostile housing environments.
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