Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside
578 F.3d 203 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
A "failure-to-transfer" claim under the Rehabilitation Act is governed by the four-year federal catch-all statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 1658, because the cause of action was created by a statutory amendment enacted after December 1, 1990.
Facts:
- Barbara Fowler was employed as a janitor/housekeeper by UPMC Shadyside Hospital.
- On April 22, 2002, Fowler sustained an injury on the job.
- Following her injury, Fowler's doctor released her to perform only sedentary work.
- UPMC provided Fowler with a light-duty clerical position, but before this position was eliminated, she applied for a similar sedentary job as a telephone operator.
- UPMC never contacted Fowler about the telephone operator position or any other open positions.
- On August 29, 2003, UPMC eliminated Fowler's light-duty clerical position.
- UPMC terminated Fowler's employment on September 24, 2003.
Procedural Posture:
- Barbara Fowler first asserted her claims as a plaintiff in an amended complaint filed in a separate class action, Tish v. Magee-Woman’s Hospital of UPMC.
- The district court judge in the Tish case severed the plaintiffs and directed that Fowler's claims should be filed as an individual case.
- Fowler filed her individual complaint against UPMC Shadyside in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on June 14, 2007.
- The District Court granted UPMC's motion to dismiss the complaint, finding it was time-barred by a two-year statute of limitations and, alternatively, failed to state a claim.
- Fowler (appellant) appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, with UPMC Shadyside as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does the four-year federal catch-all statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 1658 apply to failure-to-transfer claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act, rather than a shorter, state-borrowed statute of limitations?
Opinions:
Majority - Nygaard, Circuit Judge
Yes, the four-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 1658 applies to failure-to-transfer claims under the Rehabilitation Act. The court reasoned that while the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 lacks its own statute of limitations, leading courts to typically 'borrow' a state's analogous limitation period, a federal 'catch-all' statute (§ 1658) mandates a four-year period for claims arising under Acts of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990. The Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. established that § 1658 applies not only to new statutes but also to amendments that create new causes of action. The duty for an employer to transfer a disabled employee as a reasonable accommodation did not exist under the original Rehabilitation Act but was introduced in a 1992 amendment that incorporated standards from the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Because this amendment created the failure-to-transfer cause of action after 1990, the four-year limitation period from § 1658 governs. Fowler's filing was therefore timely. The court also held that her complaint satisfied the plausibility pleading standard of Twombly and Iqbal and that the district court erred in deciding the legal question of her disability at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Analysis:
This decision resolves a conflict among district courts within the Third Circuit, establishing a clear and longer four-year statute of limitations for failure-to-transfer claims under the Rehabilitation Act. By applying the Supreme Court's Jones precedent, the court affirmed that amendments creating new rights of action in older statutes trigger the modern federal catch-all limitations period, thereby expanding the time for plaintiffs to seek relief. The opinion also serves as an important early application of the Iqbal plausibility pleading standard in the employment discrimination context, clarifying that a plaintiff need not prove a prima facie case in their complaint but must allege sufficient facts to make the claim plausible.
