Fowler v. United States
2011 U.S. LEXIS 4019, 563 U.S. 668, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1099 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
Under the federal witness tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), when a defendant kills a person with the general intent to prevent communication with law enforcement, the government must prove there was a reasonable likelihood that a relevant communication would have been made to a federal officer.
Facts:
- In the early morning of March 3, 1998, Charles Fowler and several other men met in a cemetery to prepare to rob a bank.
- The group put on dark clothing, began to drink alcohol and use drugs, and discussed the robbery.
- A local police officer, Todd Horner, discovered the group, drew his gun, and asked them to identify themselves.
- Fowler and some of the others overpowered Officer Horner and took his firearm.
- After Horner spoke to one of the men by name, Fowler stated, 'Now we can’t walk away from this thing.'
- Fowler then shot and killed Officer Horner.
Procedural Posture:
- Fowler was charged by federal authorities for violating the federal witness tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C).
- Following a trial in federal district court, Fowler was convicted.
- Fowler (appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove he intended to prevent communication with a federal officer.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that a showing of a 'possible or potential communication to federal authorities' was a sufficient standard.
- Fowler (petitioner) sought, and was granted, a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Under the federal witness tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), when a defendant kills a person with the general intent to prevent communication with any law enforcement officer, must the government show that there was a reasonable likelihood the communication would have been made to a federal officer?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Breyer
Yes. Where a defendant kills a person with an intent to prevent communication with law enforcement officers generally, the government must show a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the relevant communications would have been made to a federal officer. The statute requires an 'intent to prevent' a communication with a federal officer. To give this requirement meaning, the government must show more than a mere 'possibility' of federal communication, as that standard would improperly federalize many purely state crimes and render the statute's 'of the United States' language superfluous. The 'reasonable likelihood' standard avoids this problem by requiring the government to show the likelihood of federal involvement was 'more than remote, outlandish, or simply hypothetical,' without imposing an overly burdensome standard like proving it was 'more likely than not.'
Dissenting - Justice Alito
No. The majority's 'reasonable likelihood' test improperly adds an element to the statute that Congress did not include. The plain text of § 1512(a)(1)(C) focuses exclusively on the defendant's intent (mens rea). If a defendant intends to prevent communication about a possible federal crime to any law enforcement officer, that intent necessarily includes the set of federal officers who could investigate that crime. The statute does not require any showing about the objective probability of a future event. The majority's test erroneously shifts the focus from the defendant's state of mind to an external probability, and it makes little sense to make a killer's culpability dependent on their tolerance for risk.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
No. Although I agree the case should be remanded, the majority's 'reasonable likelihood' standard is incorrect and has no basis in law. The statute's provision that 'no state of mind need be proved' regarding the officer's federal status (§ 1512(g)(2)) removes the federal officer element from the defendant's mens rea, but it remains an element of the actus reus. Therefore, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the communication the defendant sought to prevent would have, in fact, been made to a federal officer. The majority's vague 'reasonable likelihood' test is a novel standard for an essential element of a criminal conviction and will only confuse courts, whereas a 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard aligns with criminal law principles and federalism concerns by limiting the statute to cases with a clear federal nexus.
Analysis:
This decision resolves a circuit split regarding the evidentiary standard required to establish a federal nexus in witness tampering cases under 18 U.S.C. § 1512. The Court's creation of the 'reasonable likelihood' test establishes a middle-ground standard that prevents over-federalization of local crimes while still allowing prosecution where a defendant's intent was general. The test provides prosecutors with a clear, albeit flexible, standard for cases where a victim had not yet communicated with federal authorities. However, the fractured nature of the decision, with strong dissents and concurrences proposing alternative tests, indicates the statutory language is ambiguous and may lead to future litigation over what factual circumstances satisfy the 'reasonable likelihood' threshold.
