Foucha v. Louisiana
504 U.S. 71 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from continuing to confine an insanity acquittee who is no longer mentally ill, even if that individual may still be dangerous. To continue confinement, the state must initiate civil commitment proceedings that require a showing of both current mental illness and dangerousness.
Facts:
- Terry Foucha was charged by Louisiana authorities with aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm.
- At trial, doctors reported that Foucha was insane at the time of the offense and unable to distinguish right from wrong.
- On October 12, 1984, a Louisiana court found Foucha not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) and committed him to the East Feliciana Forensic Facility.
- In 1988, the superintendent of the facility recommended that Foucha be discharged, and a hospital review panel reported that Foucha had shown no evidence of mental illness since his admission.
- At a subsequent release hearing, a doctor testified that Foucha had recovered from a temporary drug-induced psychosis he likely suffered at the time of the offense.
- The same doctor testified that Foucha currently showed no signs of psychosis or neurosis, but possessed an 'antisocial personality,' which is not a mental disease.
- The doctor noted that Foucha had been involved in several altercations at the facility and stated he would not feel comfortable certifying that Foucha would not be a danger to himself or others.
Procedural Posture:
- Terry Foucha was charged in a Louisiana trial court with aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm.
- The trial court found Foucha not guilty by reason of insanity and ordered him committed to a state mental facility.
- Four years later, after a hospital panel recommended Foucha's conditional release, the same trial court held a hearing.
- At the hearing, the trial court found Foucha to be dangerous to himself and others and ordered him returned to the mental facility.
- Foucha's application for supervisory writs to the Louisiana Court of Appeal was refused.
- The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding the state's statutory scheme constitutional.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a state statute that permits the indefinite confinement of an insanity acquittee in a mental institution, based solely on a finding of dangerousness without a current diagnosis of mental illness, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
Yes, a state statute permitting the indefinite confinement of a sane but dangerous insanity acquittee violates the Due Process Clause. The Constitution permits the government to confine an insanity acquittee to a mental institution only until such time as they have regained their sanity or are no longer a danger. Since Louisiana did not contend Foucha was mentally ill, the basis for holding him as an insanity acquittee had disappeared. Due process requires that the nature of a commitment bear a reasonable relation to its purpose; confining a sane person in a mental institution is improper. Furthermore, the statute violates substantive due process by permitting indefinite detention based on dangerousness alone, unlike the narrowly tailored exceptions for pretrial detention in cases like United States v. Salerno, and it improperly shifts the burden of proof to the detainee. The scheme also violates the Equal Protection Clause by treating sane acquittees differently than other dangerous individuals, such as convicts who have completed their sentences, who cannot be confined based on dangerousness alone.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
Yes, the Louisiana statute is unconstitutional. This holding is narrow and addresses only the specific scheme before the Court, which permits the indefinite confinement of sane individuals in psychiatric facilities. It does not preclude states from enacting more narrowly drawn laws for detaining dangerous insanity acquittees, provided the nature and duration of the detention are tailored to pressing public safety concerns. A critical flaw here is the confinement of a sane person in a mental institution, as there is no medical justification for such placement, breaking the necessary connection between the nature and purpose of confinement. Equal protection principles also raise serious questions about the permissibility of holding a sane acquittee longer than a person convicted of the same crime could be imprisoned.
Dissenting - Justice Kennedy
No, the Louisiana statute is constitutional. The majority errs by applying the standards for civil commitment to a criminal proceeding. An acquittal by reason of insanity follows a determination that the defendant committed the criminal act, distinguishing it fundamentally from a civil commitment where no criminal conduct has been proven. This proof of a criminal act provides a legitimate and constitutional basis for incapacitative incarceration to protect society. The majority improperly overrules the central holding of Jones v. United States, which correctly distinguished between civil and criminal commitments and permitted the automatic confinement of insanity acquittees after a criminal adjudication. The State's interest in public safety provides a reasonable basis for the confinement.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No, the Louisiana statute does not violate the Constitution. A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity means the defendant committed the criminal act but is exempted from responsibility, which creates a legitimate distinction between insanity acquittees and civil committees. This distinction does not disappear when an acquittee regains sanity, as the state retains a substantial interest in protecting society from an individual who has already proven to be dangerous. The Louisiana scheme is reasonable, reflects the Model Penal Code, and is not a violation of substantive due process, which requires only a rational basis for such laws. The Court wrongly elevates 'freedom from bodily restraint' to a fundamental right in this context, which would require strict scrutiny and is inconsistent with precedent regarding the confinement of the mentally ill.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limits a state's authority to confine individuals acquitted of crimes by reason of insanity. The Court established that dangerousness alone, absent a concurrent mental illness, is an insufficient constitutional basis for the continued confinement of an insanity acquittee in a mental hospital. This ruling strengthens the due process rights of acquittees by requiring states to either release them upon restoration of sanity or use standard civil commitment procedures, which mandate proof of both mental illness and dangerousness. The decision curtails the state's ability to use the insanity acquittal as a basis for preventative detention and reinforces the principle that the nature of confinement must be reasonably related to its justification.
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