FOSTER v. McDOWELL
344 P.3d 1102 (2015)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A proceeding to adjudicate parentage, such as a divorce action, that is commenced within two years of a child's birth and results in a judicial finding of non-paternity, effectively rebuts the marital presumption of paternity. Once this presumption is rebutted, a paternity action against a putative father may be brought at any time, as the child no longer has a presumed, acknowledged, or adjudicated father.
Facts:
- Melissa Foster was married to Ryan David Pratt when a child, R.D.P., was born on January 10, 2010.
- Pratt was listed as the father on the child's birth certificate.
- On May 2, 2011, when the child was approximately 16 months old, Pratt initiated divorce proceedings against Foster.
- During the divorce proceedings on July 25, 2011, Foster and Pratt stipulated that Pratt was not the child's father, and the family court entered a minute order finding the same.
- The final divorce decree, entered on January 11, 2012, confirmed the stipulation that Pratt was not the child's father.
- On August 15, 2013, Foster filed a paternity suit against Vernon McDowell.
- At a court hearing on September 25, 2013, McDowell admitted that he was the biological father of the child.
Procedural Posture:
- Melissa Foster filed a paternity suit against Vernon McDowell in the District Court of Muskogee County, Oklahoma.
- Based on McDowell's in-court admission of paternity, the trial court entered a decree of paternity and ordered him to pay child support.
- McDowell filed a motion to vacate the paternity decree, arguing the action was barred by a two-year statute of limitations.
- The trial court denied McDowell's motion to vacate.
- McDowell, as Appellant, appealed the trial court's decree and its denial of his motion to vacate to the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a divorce proceeding, commenced within two years of a child's birth, in which the husband and wife stipulate and the court finds that the husband is not the child's father, effectively rebut the husband's legal presumption of paternity, thereby allowing the mother to file a paternity action against another man after the two-year statutory period has expired?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Robert D. Bell
Yes. A divorce proceeding commenced within two years of a child's birth that adjudicates the husband's non-paternity successfully rebuts the legal presumption that he is the father. The Oklahoma Uniform Parentage Act requires that any action to challenge a presumed father's status be commenced within two years of the child's birth. The Act also permits a parentage proceeding to be joined with a divorce action. Pratt commenced the divorce when the child was 1.5 years old, well within the two-year limit, and the court's finding of his non-paternity in that proceeding legally rebutted the presumption. Because the child was subsequently left with 'no presumed, acknowledged, or adjudicated father,' the statute allows a new paternity action against another man, McDowell, to be brought at any time. Furthermore, McDowell's in-court admission of paternity independently authorized the trial court to enter a paternity decree against him.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the procedural requirements for rebutting the marital presumption of paternity under the Oklahoma Uniform Parentage Act. It establishes that a formal, separate paternity action is not the exclusive method; a finding of non-paternity within a timely-filed divorce proceeding is sufficient to rebut the presumption. This prevents a putative biological father from using the two-year statute of limitations as a shield when the presumed marital father has already been legally disestablished as the parent within that same statutory timeframe. The ruling emphasizes substance over form, focusing on whether the issue of paternity was raised and adjudicated in a timely-commenced proceeding.
