Fortney v. Guzman
482 S.W.3d 784, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 75, 2015 WL 2437551 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
To overcome a qualified privilege in a defamation action, the plaintiff must produce affirmative evidence of both the statement's falsity and the speaker's actual malice. A plaintiff's mere assertion that the statement is false is insufficient, by itself, to create an inference of malice necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Facts:
- Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS) investigator Barbara Warman received an anonymous tip from cafeteria manager Brenda Kemp that plant operator Lynora Fortney was involved in the illicit appropriation of school property.
- During the investigation, Kemp additionally informed the school principal, Catherine Pendleton, that Fortney had given a surplus school piano to an instructor, Oralia Guzman.
- Fortney denied giving away the piano, but acknowledged she was responsible for school property and was aware of JCPS policies strictly prohibiting giving away or trashing surplus items like pianos.
- Investigator Warman confirmed a piano was missing from the school's inventory and recovered it from Guzman's home.
- Guzman submitted a written statement admitting Fortney gave her the piano, explaining that Fortney told her it was surplus and was going to be thrown away.
- Another employee, Dorothy Light, also submitted a written statement corroborating that she overheard Fortney tell Guzman she could have the piano because it was being 'trashed'.
Procedural Posture:
- Lynora Fortney filed a libel lawsuit against Oralia Guzman, Dorothy Light, Brenda Kemp, Barbara Warman, and Catherine Pendleton in the Jefferson Circuit Court, a state trial court.
- Following discovery, the appellees (Guzman, et al.) filed a joint motion for summary judgment, arguing their statements were protected by a qualified privilege.
- The Jefferson Circuit Court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed Fortney's lawsuit.
- Lynora Fortney, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's decision to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
To defeat a defendant's motion for summary judgment in a defamation case where a qualified privilege applies, is a plaintiff's mere assertion that the defamatory statement is false sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding actual malice?
Opinions:
Majority - Acree, Chief Judge
No. When a qualified privilege applies, a plaintiff's mere assertion of a statement's falsity is not sufficient to establish the actual malice required to overcome the privilege. The court held that communications made within the scope of an employment relationship, particularly during an internal investigation, are protected by a qualified privilege. Once this privilege is established, the presumption of malice in a defamation per se claim is negated. The burden shifts to the plaintiff to affirmatively prove both falsity and actual malice. Citing the recent Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Toler v. Sud-Chemie, Inc., the court explicitly overruled any part of Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. that allowed malice to be inferred from mere falsity. Fortney only offered her own testimony that the statements were false, which was insufficient to create a triable issue of fact on the essential element of malice.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a significant protection for employers and employees in Kentucky defamation law by heightening the plaintiff's burden of proof when a qualified privilege is involved. By adopting the reasoning of Toler v. Sud-Chemie, Inc., the court clarifies that plaintiffs cannot survive summary judgment simply by creating a 'he said, she said' dispute over the truth of the statement. This precedent makes it more difficult for individuals to pursue defamation claims arising from internal workplace investigations, thereby encouraging good-faith reporting of potential misconduct without fear of litigation.
