Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis
139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
The requirement under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC is a mandatory claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. An employer's objection to an employee's failure to comply with this requirement is subject to forfeiture if not timely raised.
Facts:
- Lois M. Davis worked in information technology for Fort Bend County.
- In 2010, Davis reported to human resources that the director of information technology, Charles Cook, was sexually harassing her, leading to Cook's resignation.
- Davis alleged that her supervisor, Kenneth Ford, subsequently began retaliating against her for reporting the harassment.
- In March 2011, Davis filed a formal charge with the EEOC alleging sexual harassment and retaliation.
- While her EEOC charge was pending, Davis was told to report to work on a Sunday.
- Davis informed her supervisor that she had a commitment at church that day, but was told she would be fired if she did not show up.
- When Davis went to church instead of work, Fort Bend County terminated her employment.
- Davis attempted to supplement her pending charge by handwriting "religion" on an intake questionnaire form, but she did not formally amend the charge document itself.
Procedural Posture:
- Lois Davis sued Fort Bend County in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas for religious discrimination and retaliation.
- The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fort Bend County.
- Davis, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal of the retaliation claim but reversed and remanded the religious discrimination claim.
- Fort Bend County's petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied.
- On remand to the district court, Fort Bend moved to dismiss, arguing for the first time that the court lacked jurisdiction over the religion-based claim because Davis had not included it in her EEOC charge.
- The district court granted the motion to dismiss, agreeing the requirement was jurisdictional.
- Davis, as appellant, appealed again to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed, holding the charge-filing requirement was a non-jurisdictional rule that Fort Bend, as appellee, had forfeited.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Fort Bend County's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Is Title VII's requirement that a complainant file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) before commencing a lawsuit a jurisdictional prerequisite that can be raised at any stage of litigation, or is it a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule that is subject to forfeiture if not timely asserted?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
No. Title VII's charge-filing requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, but rather a mandatory claim-processing rule that a defendant forfeits if it waits too long to raise the issue. The Court distinguishes between jurisdictional rules, which concern a court's fundamental authority to hear a case, and non-jurisdictional claim-processing rules, which are procedural steps that must be taken. The Court has recently worked to curb the 'profligate use' of the term 'jurisdictional,' reserving it for rules that clearly delineate a court's subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. Title VII's charge-filing requirement is located in a statutory provision separate from the one that grants jurisdiction to federal courts and speaks to a party's procedural obligations, not the court's authority. Therefore, because Congress did not clearly state that the charge-filing requirement is jurisdictional, it should be treated as a non-jurisdictional rule that can be waived or forfeited.
Analysis:
This unanimous decision resolves a circuit split and clarifies the nature of Title VII's administrative exhaustion requirement. By designating the charge-filing rule as a waivable claim-processing rule, the Court prevents defendants from using it as a dispositive defense late in litigation after substantial resources have been expended. This reinforces the Court's recent trend of narrowing the category of rules considered 'jurisdictional,' requiring Congress to speak clearly if it intends for a procedural requirement to limit a court's fundamental adjudicatory authority. The ruling promotes judicial efficiency and ensures that employment discrimination cases are more likely to be decided on their merits rather than being dismissed on procedural technicalities.
