Forster v. Hall

Supreme Court of Virginia
576 S.E.2d 746, 265 Va. 293 (2003)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A restrictive covenant prohibiting the 'parking and/or erecting' of 'mobile homes' applies to manufactured homes towed to a lot and permanently affixed to a foundation. An implied reciprocal negative easement binds a purchaser with actual or constructive notice of a general development scheme, even if the restriction is omitted from their specific deed.

Facts:

Goose Creek Partnership developed a 113-lot subdivision called Goose Creek Estates.
The partnership sold 105 of the 113 lots with deeds containing a restrictive covenant stating 'no mobile homes, either single or double-wide, may be parked and/or erected on the property.'
Richard A. Forster purchased lots in the subdivision that were subject to this restriction.
The Halls and the McKinneys each purchased lots in the subdivision and specifically requested that the 'no mobile homes' restriction be omitted from their deeds.
At the Halls' direction, their children moved two double-wide manufactured homes onto their lot, placing them on brick foundations and removing the tongues and wheels.
The McKinneys conveyed portions of their lot to their daughters, who also moved double-wide manufactured homes onto the property, placing them on cinder block foundations and removing the tongues and wheels.

Procedural Posture:

Richard A. Forster filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Tazewell County (the trial court) against the Halls, McKinneys, and their children (the landowners).
Forster sought an injunction requiring the removal of four double-wide manufactured homes, arguing they violated an implied reciprocal negative easement.
The trial court chancellor held that an implied reciprocal negative easement prohibiting mobile homes did exist and applied to the landowners' lots.
However, the chancellor ruled that the structures were not 'mobile homes' in violation of the restriction because they had been permanently affixed to the real property.
The chancellor entered a final decree awarding judgment to the landowners.
Forster (appellant) appealed the chancellor's ruling on the definition of 'mobile home' to the Supreme Court of Virginia, and the landowners (appellees) assigned cross-error to the finding that an easement existed.

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Issue:

Does placing a double-wide manufactured home on a permanent foundation violate an implied reciprocal negative easement that prohibits 'mobile homes' from being 'parked and/or erected' on the property?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Koontz

Yes. Placing a double-wide manufactured home on a permanent foundation violates the implied reciprocal negative easement. First, the court affirmed that an implied reciprocal negative easement restricting mobile homes applies to all lots in the subdivision, including those of the landowners. This is because the developer established a general scheme of development, evidenced by including the restriction in 93% of the deeds. The landowners had actual notice of this scheme because they specifically requested the restriction be omitted from their deeds, which is not enough to escape the burden of the easement. Second, the court held that the structures are 'mobile homes' within the meaning of the covenant. The covenant's language prohibiting homes from being 'parked and/or erected' negates any distinction between temporary placement and permanent affixation. The structures were mobile homes when they were brought onto the lots, and the subsequent act of placing them on a foundation and removing the wheels does not transform their essential character to circumvent the unambiguous restriction.

Analysis:

This decision clarifies the scope of restrictive covenants that prohibit 'mobile homes,' establishing that such restrictions apply to modern manufactured homes even after they are permanently affixed to the land. The ruling prevents homeowners from circumventing clear deed restrictions through superficial modifications. It reinforces the legal principle that a developer's subsequent testimony about their original intent cannot alter the unambiguous language of a recorded covenant. Furthermore, the case confirms that a purchaser's actual knowledge of a common development scheme is sufficient to create a binding implied easement on their property, even if their deed is silent on the matter.

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