Ford v. Whipple
483 S.E.2d 591, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 633, 225 Ga. App. 276 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Georgia's "impact rule" requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a physical injury resulting from a physical impact to recover for emotional distress in a negligence action, unless the defendant's willful or wanton conduct was directed specifically at the plaintiff.
Facts:
- On February 1, 1995, Emily Claire Ford was a passenger in a vehicle.
- Elizabeth Whipple negligently drove her car at an excessive speed, through a red traffic control light.
- Whipple's car collided with the vehicle in which Emily Ford was a passenger.
- The Fords, Emily's parents, alleged that Emily, a five-year-old, sustained "fright and apprehension" and "physical shock" following the accident.
- The Fords' initial and amended complaints explicitly stated they did not believe Emily suffered any physical injury "other than the physical shock and fright," and no psychological or emotional injuries, for which they sought nominal and punitive damages.
Procedural Posture:
- The parents of Emily Claire Ford (the Fords) filed an initial complaint against Elizabeth Whipple in a trial court (court of first instance).
- Whipple answered and subsequently filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
- The Fords amended their complaint to clarify the nature of the alleged injuries.
- The trial court granted Whipple's motion to dismiss with prejudice.
- The Fords, as appellants, appealed the trial court's dismissal to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, with Whipple as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does Georgia's "impact rule" permit recovery for emotional distress when a plaintiff alleges only "fright and apprehension" or "physical shock" without an accompanying physical injury, or when the defendant's wanton conduct was not specifically directed at the plaintiff?
Opinions:
Majority - Beasley, Judge
No, Georgia's "impact rule" does not permit recovery for emotional distress when a plaintiff alleges only "fright and apprehension" or "physical shock" without an accompanying physical injury, nor when the defendant's wanton conduct was not specifically directed at the plaintiff. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Fords were precluded from recovery because their complaint expressly stated there was no physical injury. Georgia strictly adheres to the "impact rule," which requires actual bodily contact resulting in a physical injury for recovery of emotional distress in negligence claims. While the Fords alleged "physical shock and fright," the court interpreted this as not constituting a "physical injury" sufficient to satisfy the impact rule, especially since the complaint also stated "no physical injury." The court emphasized that inference of physical injury (like bruising or scratching) would be contrary to the explicit pleadings. The court also addressed the exception to the impact rule for "wilful and wanton" conduct. It reiterated that this exception applies only when such conduct is directed at the plaintiff. Although Whipple's alleged conduct (speeding and running a red light) might be considered wanton, the Fords' pleadings did not allege it was specifically directed at Emily, nor could such an inference be reasonably drawn. The court further clarified that OCGA § 51-12-6, concerning damages for injury to "peace, happiness, or feelings," did not alter the impact rule or create a new cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress; it only prescribes a measure of recovery where a cause of action already exists. The court concluded that since no measurable injury was alleged, the trial court correctly dismissed the claim.
Dissenting - Eldridge, Judge
Yes, the trial court erred in dismissing the claim, as the liberal construction of pleadings under notice pleading standards should have allowed the case to proceed given the allegations of "physical shock" and wanton conduct. Judge Eldridge dissented, arguing that the majority did "violence to the liberal construction of pleadings under the Civil Practice Act" by effectively returning to "issue pleadings" instead of "notice pleadings." He contended that a motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of their claim. The dissent argued that the allegation of "physical shock" should be construed favorably to the Fords as stating a physical injury, however de minimis, particularly since "physical shock" implicitly involves a physical reaction to impact. The existence, nature, and degree of injury should be a matter for the jury to determine based on evidence, not for a court to decide on a motion to dismiss. Furthermore, the dissent argued that the 1987 amendment to OCGA § 51-12-6, which replaced the former section on "vindictive damages" and provided for "injuries to peace, happiness, or feelings" as exclusive damages, should be interpreted as potentially allowing recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress, thus legislatively repealing prior case law that barred such claims. Finally, regarding the "wilful and wanton" conduct exception, the dissent argued that the question of whether Whipple's reckless driving was "directed at anyone who the driver may foreseeably injure" is a factual question that cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss. To require the complaint to specifically allege such intent is a return to issue pleading.
Analysis:
This case strongly reaffirms Georgia's strict "impact rule" for emotional distress claims in negligence actions, demonstrating the high bar plaintiffs must clear in the absence of tangible physical harm. It illustrates the court's narrow interpretation of what constitutes a "physical injury" and its insistence on a specific "directed" component for the willful/wanton conduct exception. The dissent highlights a tension between modern notice-pleading standards and the impact rule's evidentiary demands, suggesting the ruling could lead to procedural difficulties and premature dismissals for plaintiffs alleging non-obvious injuries. Future cases will continue to scrutinize the line between "physical shock" and "physical injury" and the specificity required for alleging "directed" wanton conduct.
