Ford v. Revlon, Inc.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc
153 Ariz. 38, 734 P.2d 580 (1987)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

An employer may be held independently liable for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when it fails to take appropriate and timely action in response to an employee's complaints of sexual harassment by a supervisor, regardless of whether the supervisor is found liable for the same tort.

Facts:

In October 1979, Karl Braun became Leta Fay Ford's supervisor at Revlon, Inc.
On April 3, 1980, at a dinner, Braun made sexual advances toward Ford and threatened her career when she rejected him.
On May 3, 1980, at a company picnic, Braun publicly threatened to sexually assault Ford, then later grabbed her in a chokehold and groped her until a friend intervened.
Starting in late May 1980, Ford began reporting Braun's conduct to numerous Revlon managers and personnel staff, stating that she was afraid of him.
Over the next several months, Revlon management took no substantive action, with one corporate manager telling Ford the situation was 'too hot' and suggesting she try to forget it.
During this period, Braun continued to harass Ford at work, and Ford developed high blood pressure, a nervous tic, and other physical symptoms of severe emotional stress.
On February 24, 1981, one day after Ford submitted a written transfer request, Braun placed her on probation for allegedly poor work performance.
In October 1981, after months of inaction by Revlon, Ford attempted suicide; Revlon terminated Braun later that month.

Procedural Posture:

Leta Fay Ford sued Karl Braun and Revlon, Inc. in an Arizona trial court for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
A jury found Braun liable for assault and battery, but not liable for IIED.
The same jury found Revlon liable for IIED, but not liable for assault and battery, and awarded Ford compensatory and punitive damages against Revlon.
Revlon, as appellant, appealed the judgment against it to the Arizona Court of Appeals, with Ford as appellee.
The Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court, reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that Revlon could not be liable for IIED if its agent, Braun, was not found liable for the same tort.
Ford, as petitioner, petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for review.

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Issue:

May an employer be held independently liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress for failing to take appropriate action in response to an employee's complaints of sexual harassment, even when its supervisor is found not guilty of that same tort?

Opinions:

Majority - Cameron, Justice

Yes. An employer can be held independently liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on its own conduct. The court distinguished this from vicarious liability, where a principal's liability is derived solely from its agent's actions. Here, Revlon's liability was predicated on its own independent acts of failing to investigate and remedy Ford's repeated complaints of sexual harassment. The court found Revlon's conduct met the three elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress: (1) Revlon's months-long failure to act, in violation of its own policies, was extreme and outrageous; (2) Revlon's reckless disregard of Ford's complaints and known suffering made it nearly certain that severe emotional distress would result; and (3) Ford did, in fact, suffer severe emotional distress, evidenced by physical ailments and a suicide attempt. The court also held the claim was not barred by workers' compensation because Revlon's intentional conduct was not an 'accident' under the statute.

Concurring - Feldman, Vice Chief Justice

Yes. While concurring in the result, this opinion disagreed with the majority's reasoning regarding the workers' compensation issue. Justice Feldman argued that under Arizona's expansive definition, Ford's injury did qualify as a work-related 'accident' and would normally be covered exclusively by workers' compensation. However, the tort remedy should be available because the underlying wrong—sexual harassment and an employer's failure to stop it—is not a 'necessary risk or danger' inherent in employment that the workers' compensation system was designed to address. The essence of the tort is non-physical and violates public policy, placing it outside the fundamental purpose of the workers' compensation scheme, thus allowing a direct tort action against the employer.

Analysis:

This case establishes a significant precedent for employer liability in harassment cases by moving beyond vicarious liability to recognize an employer's independent, direct liability for its own inaction. By holding that Revlon's failure to investigate and remedy harassment constituted its own 'outrageous conduct,' the court created a direct duty for employers to act on such complaints. This decision makes it difficult for companies to escape liability by arguing that the harassing employee's conduct did not meet the threshold for a tort, shifting the focus to the reasonableness and adequacy of the corporate response. It strongly incentivizes employers to create and, more importantly, enforce robust anti-harassment policies and investigation procedures.

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