Ford Motor Company v. Moulton
1974 Tenn. LEXIS 498, 511 S.W.2d 690, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 312 (1974)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The retroactive application of a statute of limitations to revive a cause of action that was already time-barred under the prior law is unconstitutional because it deprives the defendant of a vested right to a defense. A cause of action for product liability torts accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, on the date the product is purchased, not on the date the injury occurs.
Facts:
- On April 30, 1969, Moulton purchased a 1969 Ford LTD automobile from Hull-Dobbs, a retail dealer.
- The sales contract included clauses from both Ford Motor Company and Hull-Dobbs disclaiming all implied warranties.
- Ford also provided a one-year or twelve thousand mile express warranty.
- On July 5, 1970, more than a year after the purchase, Moulton was driving the car on Interstate 40.
- The car allegedly went out of control due to a defect in the steering mechanism, veered off the road, and fell twenty-six feet.
- Moulton sustained serious personal injuries in the accident.
Procedural Posture:
- Moulton and his wife filed a complaint on May 13, 1971, against Ford Motor Company and Hull-Dobbs in the trial court.
- The defendants filed motions for summary judgment.
- The trial judge dismissed the warranty counts, finding the disclaimers valid and the express warranty expired.
- The trial judge also dismissed the negligence, strict liability, and misrepresentation counts as barred by the one-year statute of limitations, which he held began to run on the date of purchase.
- Moulton, as appellant, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the warranty counts but reversed the dismissal of the tort counts, finding they were not time-barred due to a 1972 statutory amendment it applied retroactively.
- Ford and Hull-Dobbs, as petitioners, sought and were granted a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of Tennessee to review the Court of Appeals' decision on the statute of limitations issue.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the retroactive application of an amended statute of limitations, which revives a cause of action that was already barred under the previous version of the statute, violate the Tennessee Constitution by impairing a vested right?
Opinions:
Majority - Chattin, J.
Yes. The retroactive application of the amended statute of limitations to revive an already barred cause of action is unconstitutional because it impairs a defendant's vested right to the statute of limitations defense. Under the controlling precedent at the time, Jackson v. General Motors, the one-year statute of limitations for Moulton's tort claims began to run on the date of purchase, April 30, 1969. Therefore, the statute expired on April 30, 1970, before Moulton's injury even occurred and long before the 1972 amendment was passed. Once the statute has run, the defendant acquires a vested right to that defense, which is protected by the Tennessee Constitution's prohibition against retrospective laws that divest or impair vested rights. The legislature cannot constitutionally enact a statute that revives a claim that has already been extinguished.
Dissenting - Fones, J.
No. The application of the amended statute should not be considered an unconstitutional retroactive revival of a barred claim, because the claim was never justly barred in the first place. A cause of action in tort requires both a breach of duty and an injury; therefore, a cause of action cannot accrue until an injury is sustained. Moulton's injury occurred on July 5, 1970, so his cause of action could not have existed before that date. To hold that the statute of limitations expired before the cause of action even arose deprives the plaintiff of his constitutional right to redress for an injury. A defendant cannot acquire a vested right in the repose of a cause of action that has not yet come into existence.
Analysis:
This case solidifies a strict, manufacturer-protective rule for the accrual of the statute of limitations in product liability cases, starting the clock at the date of sale rather than the date of injury. The majority's holding emphasizes the constitutional protection of a defendant's 'vested right' in a statute of limitations defense, prioritizing the policy of repose over a plaintiff's ability to seek redress. This decision created a situation where a products liability claim could be extinguished before the injury ever occurred, prompting legislative action to change the accrual rule. The dissent's reasoning foreshadowed the eventual widespread adoption of the 'discovery rule,' which holds that a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff is injured and discovers, or should have discovered, the cause of the injury.
