Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan
333 U.S. 6 (1948)
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Rule of Law:
The provision of the Immigration Act authorizing deportation for an alien who is 'sentenced more than once' applies only to an alien who, after a first conviction and sentencing, subsequently commits another crime and is convicted and sentenced for it, thereby establishing them as a 'repeater'.
Facts:
- Fong Haw Tan, a native of China, was indicted on two counts of murder.
- One count charged the murder of Lai Quan.
- The second count charged the murder of Ong Kim, occurring on or about the same date.
- A jury convicted Tan of murder under both counts in a single trial.
- A single judgment was entered, sentencing Tan to life imprisonment for each of the two murder convictions.
- Sometime thereafter, the Immigration Service issued a warrant for Tan's deportation.
- Tan was later paroled from prison and taken into the custody of the Immigration Service.
Procedural Posture:
- The Immigration Service issued a warrant to deport Fong Haw Tan based on his two murder convictions.
- After his parole from prison, Tan was taken into federal custody and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in U.S. District Court to challenge his detention.
- The District Court denied the petition.
- Tan (appellant) appealed the denial to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Tan's (petitioner) petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts.
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Issue:
Does the phrase 'sentenced more than once' in the Immigration Act of 1917 apply to an alien who is convicted of two distinct crimes in a single trial and sentenced for both in a single judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Douglas
No. The phrase 'sentenced more than once' requires that an alien be convicted and sentenced for a crime, and then subsequently commit, be convicted of, and be sentenced for another crime. The Court reasoned that deportation is a drastic measure, equivalent to banishment or exile, and therefore any ambiguity in the statute must be construed narrowly and in favor of the alien. The legislative history supports this 'repeater' interpretation, as congressmen who sponsored the provision stated it was aimed at the 'confirmed type' of criminal 'who is guilty of a second offense.' The statute thus authorizes deportation only where an alien, having been convicted and sentenced for one crime, commits another crime and is convicted and sentenced for it in a subsequent proceeding.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of the deportation provision by establishing a recidivist or 'repeater' requirement. It prevents the government from deporting an alien based on multiple convictions arising from a single criminal proceeding. The Court's application of the rule of lenity—interpreting ambiguous punitive statutes in favor of the individual—set a strong precedent for how courts should approach immigration laws that impose severe penalties like deportation. This ruling requires immigration authorities and courts to look at the timing and sequence of an alien's criminal convictions, not just the total number, when applying this statutory ground for removal.
