Flurer v. Pocono Medical Center
1992 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 288, 15 Pa. D. & C.4th 645 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A mother who physically experiences the in-utero death of her fetus may state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a 'percipient witness' who had a sensory and contemporaneous observance of the event. However, a father who was merely in the vicinity and learned of the death through others cannot state such a claim, as his experience is not a direct observance of the traumatic event.
Facts:
- On May 24, 1990, Jennifer Flurer, who was 30-weeks pregnant, was injured in a car accident.
- She was transported to Pocono Medical Center's emergency room complaining of abdominal pain.
- Hospital staff and Dr. Stephen L. Segrave-Daley assessed the fetus's heartbeat, recording rates of 140 and 144 beats per minute at different times.
- At 8:20 p.m., a fetal heart monitor was placed on Jennifer Flurer, which revealed that the fetus had died in utero.
- The cause of death was determined to be placental abruption.
- On May 26, 1990, Jennifer Flurer's labor was induced, and she delivered the stillborn child, Robert T. Flurer.
Procedural Posture:
- Jennifer and Robert P. Flurer sued Pocono Medical Center and associated physicians in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Pennsylvania.
- The complaint sought damages under the Wrongful Death Act, Survival Act, and for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).
- The defendants filed preliminary objections, including a demurrer (a motion to dismiss for failure to state a valid claim) to the NIED count, arguing the Flurers did not witness a traumatic event as required by law.
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Issue:
Does a mother who physically experiences the in-utero death of her fetus, and a father who is merely present nearby, sufficiently allege a 'sensory and contemporaneous observance' of a traumatic event to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law?
Opinions:
Majority - Miller, J.
Yes, as to the mother; No, as to the father. A parent may state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress only if their emotional shock results from a direct, sensory, and contemporaneous observance of the traumatic event. For the mother, her allegation that she was an 'intimate part of and witnessed by physical experience the death of her child' is sufficient to plead a direct, sensory involvement, making her a 'percipient witness' akin to those in prior cases who heard or immediately saw the aftermath of an accident. Her claim can proceed because she alleges she was physically there and experienced the death, not that she learned of it after the fact. The father's claim, however, must fail. He only alleges being in the 'immediate vicinity,' meaning any knowledge of the fetus's death necessarily came from a third party—either his wife, medical personnel, or the fetal monitor. This indirect knowledge does not constitute a direct sensory and contemporaneous observance of the traumatic event itself, which is fatal to his claim under Pennsylvania's bystander recovery rules.
Analysis:
This trial court decision provides a nuanced application of Pennsylvania's bystander recovery test, established in Sinn v. Burd, to the unique context of an in-utero fetal death. The court extends the concept of a 'percipient witness' to include a mother's internal, physical experience of her child's death, clarifying that direct visual observation is not strictly required to meet the 'sensory and contemporaneous observance' standard. By distinguishing the mother's direct physical connection from the father's indirect awareness, the case reinforces the requirement that the emotional harm must stem from a direct perception of the traumatic event itself, not from learning about it from others. This decision illustrates how courts may adapt existing legal frameworks to novel factual scenarios while maintaining the core principles designed to limit the scope of liability for emotional distress.
