Floyd v. City of New York
2011 WL 5879428, 813 F.Supp.2d 457, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135293 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
A court may exercise its discretion to reconsider a non-final interlocutory order when newly presented evidence creates a genuine dispute of a material fact that was previously considered undisputed, particularly when failing to do so would result in a manifest injustice.
Facts:
- David Floyd, an African-American man, lived in a multi-unit house in the Bronx owned by his godmother.
- On February 27, 2008, the basement tenant, also an African-American man, was locked out of his apartment and asked Floyd for assistance.
- Floyd retrieved seven to ten keys and went with the tenant to the basement apartment door.
- Floyd and the tenant began trying the different keys in the lock to find the correct one.
- Before they could open the door, three NYPD officers—Officer Cormac Joyce, Officer Eric Hernandez, and Sergeant James Kelly—approached them.
- The officers stopped the two men, frisked them, and one officer reached into Floyd's pockets.
- The officers later stated they believed a burglary was in progress, based on observing the men trying to open the door and their asserted knowledge of a midday 'burglary pattern' in the neighborhood.
Procedural Posture:
- David Floyd and other plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit against the City of New York in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- The defendants moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the stop and frisk of plaintiff David Floyd was lawful.
- The District Court initially granted the defendants' motion in part, ruling as a matter of law that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Floyd.
- Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order granting partial summary judgment.
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Issue:
Does new evidence disputing the existence of a local crime pattern, a fact previously relied upon by the court to find reasonable suspicion, create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to warrant reconsideration of a prior grant of partial summary judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Shira A. Scheindlin
Yes. New evidence that directly contradicts a previously undisputed material fact—in this case, the existence of a neighborhood burglary pattern—creates a genuine factual dispute that makes summary judgment inappropriate and warrants reconsideration of the court's prior order to prevent a manifest injustice. The court's initial grant of summary judgment depended on the combination of two undisputed facts: Floyd's actions at the door and the existence of a local burglary pattern. Neither fact alone was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. The plaintiffs have now introduced expert analysis of NYPD crime data showing only one reported burglary in the immediate 36-square-block vicinity in the two months prior to the stop. This evidence directly contests the officers' assertions and creates a triable issue of fact for a jury as to whether a 'burglary pattern' actually existed. Because the existence of the pattern is now a disputed material fact, the entire 'totality of the circumstances' analysis is altered, and summary judgment is no longer appropriate. While the plaintiffs were not diligent in presenting this evidence, which was derived from data already in their possession, the court exercises its inherent authority to revise its own interlocutory orders to prevent the manifest injustice of dismissing a claim based on a fact that is now very much in doubt.
Analysis:
This opinion is significant because it scrutinizes the common police justification of a 'high crime area' or 'crime pattern,' transforming it from a subjective assertion into a disputable, data-driven factual question. The decision empowers plaintiffs to use objective crime statistics to challenge officers' stated reasons for a stop, potentially making it harder for law enforcement to prevail on summary judgment based on such generalized claims. Furthermore, it demonstrates a court's flexibility in reconsidering non-final orders to prevent a 'manifest injustice,' even in the face of a party's lack of diligence. This reinforces the principle that procedural finality can yield to substantive justice, especially in civil rights cases where the credibility of law enforcement is a central issue.
