Flowers v. Flowers
1965 Tex. App. LEXIS 2520, 397 S.W.2d 121 (1965)
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Rule of Law:
A prospective juror who demonstrates a clear bias against the subject matter of the litigation or a prejudice towards one of the parties is disqualified as a matter of law. Once such bias is established, the juror's subsequent assurances of impartiality should be disregarded, and the trial court has no discretion to overrule a challenge for cause.
Facts:
- Billie Charlene Flowers and R. A. Flowers, Jr. were involved in a legal dispute over the custody of their three minor daughters.
- During the proceedings, it was anticipated that evidence would show Billie Flowers drank alcoholic beverages socially and, on one or two occasions, to excess.
- In jury selection, a prospective juror, Mrs. E. J. Schmidt, stated she was 'against drinking in any manner' and would not grant custody to any party who drank.
- Mrs. Schmidt was a member of the same small-town church as the Flowers family.
- Before being selected, Mrs. Schmidt was overheard by another panelist stating she 'felt sorry for R. A. Flowers, Jr.' and that Billie Flowers had 'run off and left' him on a prior occasion.
Procedural Posture:
- Billie Charlene Flowers (plaintiff) sued R. A. Flowers, Jr. (defendant) for divorce and child custody in a Texas trial court.
- During voir dire, the plaintiff challenged prospective juror Mrs. E. J. Schmidt for cause, but the trial court overruled the challenge.
- The trial court denied the plaintiff the right to open and close the arguments to the jury.
- The jury decided the custody issue.
- The plaintiff moved for a mistrial based on juror disqualification, which the trial court overruled, refusing to hear supporting testimony.
- The plaintiff's subsequent motion for a new trial on the same grounds was also denied by the trial court.
- Billie Charlene Flowers (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a prospective juror's admission of a strong personal bias against a behavior central to the case and a prejudgment against one of the parties disqualify them from serving on the jury as a matter of law, even if they subsequently state under questioning from the court that they can be impartial?
Opinions:
Majority - Chapman, Justice
Yes. A prospective juror's admission of a strong personal bias against the subject matter of a case and a prejudgment against a party disqualifies them from serving as a matter of law. The Texas Constitution guarantees a trial by an impartial jury, and state statute disqualifies any person with a bias or prejudice in favor of or against either party. Citing Compton v. Henrie, the court defined prejudice as a 'pre-judgment' and bias as an inclination that prevents impartiality. Mrs. Schmidt's statements against drinking, a key issue in the custody determination, and her statements expressing sympathy for the father and disapproval of the mother established both bias and prejudice. Therefore, her disqualification was a matter of law, not judicial discretion. The court held that where bias is clearly established, a juror's later affirmation that they can be fair should be disregarded. The court also found reversible error in the trial court's refusal to allow the plaintiff, who had the burden of proof, the right to open and close the argument.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the principle that juror disqualification for statutory reasons like bias is a non-discretionary matter of law for the trial court. It underscores that a juror's deeply held personal or moral beliefs can constitute disqualifying bias when they directly relate to the specific facts or issues central to the litigation. The decision strengthens the right to an impartial jury by establishing that a juror’s own words demonstrating prejudice cannot be rehabilitated by leading questions from a judge or simple assurances of fairness. This precedent provides appellate courts with a clear basis to reverse a trial court's refusal to strike a biased juror, emphasizing that probable injury need not be proven.
