Florida Department of Children & Families v. Davis Family Day Care Home
40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 169, 160 So.3d 854, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 578 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
When an administrative agency seeks to deny an initial license application, the evidentiary standard of proof it must meet in a formal administrative hearing is the preponderance of the evidence. This lower standard applies because denying an initial application is a regulatory measure, not a penal action that implicates a vested property right.
Facts:
- Since 2007, Davis Family Day Care Home held a license as a family day care home.
- In 2011, the day care sought to renew its existing license.
- Concurrently, the day care submitted an initial application for a large family child care home license.
- If granted, the new license would permit the day care to provide care for more children than its existing license allowed.
- The Department of Children and Families (DCF) based its intent to deny the new license on several alleged statutory and rule violations related to the day care's operation under its existing license.
Procedural Posture:
- The Department of Children and Families (DCF) issued notices of its intent to deny the day care's renewal of its existing license, impose an administrative fine, and deny its initial application for a large family child care home license.
- The day care petitioned for a formal administrative hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
- The ALJ recommended that DCF grant a provisional large family child care home license, concluding that DCF was required to prove the bases for its actions by clear and convincing evidence.
- DCF issued a final order adopting the ALJ's other recommendations but rejected the recommendation to grant the new license, concluding that a lower evidentiary standard applied.
- The day care (appellant) appealed the denial of the new license to the Second District Court of Appeal, where DCF was the appellee.
- The Second District reversed DCF's order, holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard applied because the denial was disciplinary in nature.
- The Second District then certified that its decision was in direct conflict with a decision from the First District Court of Appeal, which brought the case before the Supreme Court of Florida for review.
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Issue:
Does the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof apply in a formal administrative hearing when a state agency seeks to deny an initial license application based on the applicant's alleged failure to comply with existing statutes and rules?
Opinions:
Majority - Polston, J.
No, the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof does not apply; the correct standard for an initial license application denial is preponderance of the evidence. Relying on the precedent set in Osborne Stern, the court distinguished between license revocation proceedings, which are penal in nature and require clear and convincing evidence, and initial license application proceedings, which are regulatory. The denial of an initial application is not a sanction but rather the application of a regulatory measure to a profession. An applicant for a new license does not have a vested property right, unlike the holder of an existing license. Applying a higher standard of proof would be inconsistent with the discretionary authority granted to agencies to regulate professions under the state's police power. The Second District erred by focusing on the agency's 'inartful' use of disciplinary language in its denial notice; it is the nature of the action itself (denying an initial license), not the agency's wording, that determines the applicable standard.
Dissenting - Canady, J.
This opinion does not answer the issue, but instead argues that the case should be dismissed as moot. The dissent reasons that because the day care was granted the large family child care home license during the course of the litigation, there is no longer a live controversy between the parties. The case does not satisfy the 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' exception to the mootness doctrine, which requires both that the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated and that there is a reasonable expectation the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. Since there is no longer a dispute to resolve, the court should discharge the case.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the evidentiary burdens for administrative agencies in Florida, reinforcing the distinction between regulatory and penal actions. It clarifies that denying an initial license is a regulatory function requiring only a 'preponderance of the evidence' standard, thereby preserving agency discretion in licensing. The ruling prevents applicants from benefiting from a higher standard of proof simply because an agency uses imprecise or 'inartful' disciplinary language in its notice of denial. This precedent provides a clear guideline for agencies and lower courts, emphasizing that the substance of the administrative action, not its description, dictates the legal standard.
