Flood v. News and Courier Co.
50 S.E. 637, 71 S.C. 112, 1905 S.C. LEXIS 13 (1905)
Rule of Law:
In South Carolina, the false publication of a white man as 'colored' or 'negro' constitutes libel per se, as such a designation tends to injure his social standing and reputation, and this principle is not altered by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which address only civil and political equality, not social equality.
Facts:
- The News and Courier Company was the publisher and proprietor of a newspaper with large circulation in Charleston, South Carolina.
- Augustus M. Flood was a white man of pure Caucasian blood and a citizen of Charleston, who enjoyed the respect and confidence of his white fellow-citizens.
- On October 9, 1903, The News and Courier Company published an article titled 'A Suit for Damages' concerning Augustus M. Flood.
- The article falsely stated, 'Augustus M. Flood, colored, through attorneys, Young & Young, filed suit yesterday...' regarding injuries from a trolley car accident.
- Augustus M. Flood claimed that by such publication, the defendant falsely called him 'colored' and meant to publish him as a negro.
- Augustus M. Flood asserted that this false and defamatory publication tended to exclude him from society and injured his reputation and feelings, causing him ten thousand dollars in damages.
Procedural Posture:
- Augustus M. Flood filed a complaint against The News and Courier Company in the Court of Common Pleas for libel.
- The News and Courier Company filed a demurrer to the complaint, arguing that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, as the term 'colored' was not libelous or defamatory under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
- The presiding Judge in the Court of Common Pleas sustained the defendant's demurrer.
- Augustus M. Flood (plaintiff) appealed the trial court's ruling to the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
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Issue:
Does the false publication of a white man as 'colored' or 'negro' constitute libel per se in South Carolina, such that special damages need not be alleged, and have the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution altered this legal principle?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Pope
Yes, the false publication of a white man as 'colored' or 'negro' constitutes libel per se in South Carolina, and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution have not altered this legal principle regarding social distinctions. The Court defined libel as malicious defamation, expressed by writing or printing, that tends to blacken one's reputation, expose them to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or cause them to be shunned or avoided. Written words that diminish respectability and expose to disgrace are actionable even if no special damages are alleged. The Court affirmed that calling a white man a negro or mulatto has historically been held actionable per se in South Carolina, citing precedents like Eden v. Legare (1791) and Woods v. King (1818). This is because such a designation 'affects the social status of the white man,' interfering with his social relations and pride, and tending to exclude him from society. The Court emphasized the radical distinction between white and black individuals and pointed to South Carolina's statutory laws, such as miscegenation statutes, separate coach laws for railroads, and separate schooling provisions, as evidence of enforced social segregation. These laws legally reinforce the social separation of races. The Court cited Louisiana cases, Spotorno v. Fourichon and Upton v. Times-Democrat Publishing Co., which similarly recognized the injurious and damaging nature of falsely charging a white man with being a negro. Regarding the federal amendments, the Court held that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments address the civil and political rights of the negro race, ensuring their equality before the law, but make 'not the slightest reference to the social conditions of the two races.' Citing Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court reiterated that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to enforce legal equality, not to abolish distinctions based on color, enforce social equality, or facilitate commingling. Social equality, if it is to exist, must be 'the result of natural affinities' and 'voluntary consent,' as legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts. Therefore, these federal amendments have not destroyed the state law which makes the publication of a white man as a negro libelous.
Concurring - Messrs. Justices Gary, Jones, and Woods
Messrs. Justices Gary, Jones, and Woods concur in the remit (reversal and remand) because the plaintiff's complaint alleges that the publication was wilful and malicious.
Analysis:
This case profoundly illustrates the judicial upholding of racial hierarchy and social segregation during the Jim Crow era, particularly in the American South. The ruling explicitly defines the false designation of a white person as 'colored' or 'negro' as libel per se, underscoring the legal system's role in protecting a perceived 'white social status' and reinforcing the inherent 'injury' associated with being identified as Black. By distinguishing between civil/political equality (addressed by the post-Civil War amendments) and social equality (which the court argued was beyond legislative reach and a matter of 'natural affinities'), the decision leverages and applies the 'separate but equal' doctrine from Plessy v. Ferguson. This legal framework permitted and legitimized racial discrimination in social spheres, demonstrating how courts actively participated in maintaining the social order and prevailing prejudices of the time. The case provides critical insight into the historical application of libel law as a tool to police racial boundaries and reflects the limited scope of federal civil rights protections perceived by state courts of that era.
