Flippo v. State
1975 Ark. LEXIS 1619, 258 Ark. 233, 523 S.W.2d 390 (1975)
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Rule of Law:
A person who voluntarily assumes a duty to render aid to a helpless and injured person, and in doing so secludes them and deters others from rendering aid, can be held criminally liable for involuntary manslaughter if their subsequent negligent failure to act is the proximate cause of the victim's death.
Facts:
- Robert L. Flippo, Jr. (the father) drove his son, Robert M. Flippo (Bobby), and a friend to a clover field to look for deer tracks.
- In overcast conditions nearing nightfall, Bobby fired his rifle at an object he mistook for a deer.
- The shot struck Roy Ralph Sharp, severely injuring his leg to the point it was 'almost off at the hip.'
- Bobby, despite having safety training, administered no first aid to the conscious and bleeding victim.
- The Flippos encountered the victim's elderly father and assured him they were going to call an ambulance.
- Instead of using several nearby phones, Mr. Flippo drove 12-14 miles to his own home to make the call.
- Before calling for help, Mr. Flippo directed the boys to hide the rifle used in the shooting and replace it with a shotgun on the truck's gun rack.
- Roy Ralph Sharp bled to death; a pathologist testified that prompt medical treatment or on-site first aid could have saved his life.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert L. Flippo, Jr. and Robert M. Flippo were charged with involuntary manslaughter.
- Following a trial in a state trial court, a jury found both appellants guilty.
- The appellants appealed their convictions to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdicts.
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Issue:
Does sufficient evidence exist to support involuntary manslaughter convictions for a person who negligently shoots another and for his companion who, after voluntarily assuming a duty to summon aid, unreasonably delays in doing so, thereby preventing others from rendering timely assistance?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Frank Holt
Yes. There is substantial evidence to find both appellants criminally negligent, supporting their involuntary manslaughter convictions. For Robert M. Flippo (Bobby), the jury could find he acted 'without due caution and circumspection' by firing at an unconfirmed target in poor visibility while hunting out of season. His subsequent failure to render aid also supports the finding of criminal negligence. For Robert L. Flippo, Jr. (the father), criminal liability stems from his failure to act after creating a legal duty to do so. By assuring the victim’s father he would call an ambulance, Mr. Flippo voluntarily assumed the care of the victim and secluded him from other potential rescuers who were deterred by this promise. His subsequent actions—driving 12-14 miles past available phones and first stopping to hide the weapon—constituted an unreasonable delay that breached this duty and was a proximate cause of the victim's death.
Dissenting - Justices Brown and Fogleman
A dissent was noted regarding the affirmance of the conviction of Robert L. Flippo, Jr. (the father), but no reasoning was provided in the text of the majority opinion.
Analysis:
This case is significant for its application of the 'failure to act' doctrine in criminal law, specifically establishing that a legal duty can be created by a voluntary assumption of care. The decision clarifies that a person who promises to render aid, and in doing so causes others to stand down, is legally bound to act with reasonable diligence. The court's ruling extends potential criminal liability beyond the individual who directly caused the initial injury to an associate who undertakes and then negligently fails to perform a duty of care, thereby causing or contributing to the victim's death. This precedent solidifies the principle that an omission, not just an affirmative act, can be the basis for a manslaughter conviction.
