Fletcher v. Weir
455 U.S. 603 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
The use of a defendant's post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the defendant has not been given Miranda warnings.
Facts:
- Ronnie Buchanan and respondent Weir engaged in a fight in a nightclub parking lot.
- During the altercation, Buchanan pinned Weir to the ground.
- Buchanan then jumped up, shouted that he had been stabbed, and subsequently died from his stab wounds.
- Weir immediately fled the scene after the stabbing.
- Weir did not report the incident to the police.
- Upon his arrest, Weir remained silent and did not offer any exculpatory story to the arresting officers.
- At his trial, Weir testified for the first time that he had acted in self-defense and that the stabbing was accidental.
Procedural Posture:
- Respondent Weir was tried for intentional murder in a Kentucky state trial court.
- During the trial, the prosecutor cross-examined Weir about his post-arrest silence.
- A jury convicted Weir of first-degree manslaughter.
- The Supreme Court of Kentucky, the state's highest court, affirmed the conviction on appeal.
- Weir filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky.
- The District Court granted the writ of habeas corpus, finding a due process violation.
- The government appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's decision.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the use of a defendant's post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes when the defendant was not given Miranda warnings?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No, the use of a defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence for impeachment does not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court reasoned that the protection established in Doyle v. Ohio, which prohibits using post-arrest silence against a defendant, is fundamentally based on the implicit assurance in Miranda warnings that silence will carry no penalty. In the absence of those warnings, the government has not induced the defendant to remain silent. Therefore, the fundamental unfairness present in Doyle does not exist, and states are free to permit cross-examination on post-arrest silence to impeach a defendant's testimony under their own rules of evidence.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of the Doyle v. Ohio rule, which protects a defendant's post-arrest silence. By making the Miranda warnings the trigger for due process protection, the Court created a clear distinction between pre- and post-Miranda silence. This allows prosecutors to impeach a defendant with their silence in the period between arrest and the issuance of Miranda warnings, potentially weakening defendants' credibility if they later offer an exculpatory story at trial. The ruling places the constitutional protection squarely on the government's affirmative action of giving the warnings, not on the mere status of being under arrest.
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