Flatley v. Mauro
46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606, 39 Cal. 4th 299, 139 P.3d 2 (2006)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A defendant's conduct that constitutes criminal extortion as a matter of law is not a "valid exercise of constitutional rights" and is therefore not protected speech or petitioning activity under California's anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16). Consequently, a defendant cannot use the anti-SLAPP statute to strike a plaintiff's complaint arising from such illegal conduct.
Facts:
- Michael Flatley and Tyna Marie Robertson had a sexual encounter in Flatley's Las Vegas hotel suite in October 2002, which Flatley maintained was consensual.
- Robertson later made a report to the Las Vegas Police Department, alleging that Flatley had raped her.
- On January 2, 2003, Robertson's attorney, D. Dean Mauro, sent a demand letter to Flatley's attorney.
- The letter accused Flatley of rape and demanded a monetary settlement by a strict deadline to prevent a lawsuit.
- The letter threatened that if the settlement was not paid, Mauro would file a lawsuit and disseminate press releases to numerous worldwide media outlets.
- The letter also threatened to conduct an "in-depth investigation" into Flatley's personal and financial life, including his "Immigration, Social Security Issuances and Use, and IRS and various State Tax Levies," and to expose any negative information found to the media and "appropriate authorities."
- In subsequent phone calls to Flatley's attorneys, Mauro reiterated his threats to "go public" and "ruin" Flatley, demanding a "seven-figure" payment to resolve the matter.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael Flatley filed a complaint against D. Dean Mauro in California superior court (trial court) for civil extortion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other claims.
- Mauro filed a special motion to strike Flatley's complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), arguing his conduct was protected pre-litigation activity.
- The trial court denied Mauro's motion to strike, finding his communications were not protected by the statute.
- Mauro, as appellant, appealed the trial court's denial to the California Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal, with Flatley as appellee, affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Mauro's communications constituted criminal extortion as a matter of law and were therefore unprotected.
- The Supreme Court of California granted Mauro's petition for review.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does an attorney's pre-litigation demand letter and subsequent communications, which threaten to publicize a client's rape allegation and expose unrelated, potentially damaging personal information to the media and authorities unless a large monetary settlement is paid, constitute protected petitioning activity under California's anti-SLAPP statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Moreno, J.
No. An attorney's communications that constitute criminal extortion as a matter of law are not protected petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is to protect the valid exercise of constitutional speech and petition rights. Illegal activity, such as criminal extortion, is not a valid exercise of these rights and thus falls outside the statute's protection. Mauro's letter and phone calls threatened to accuse Flatley of rape and other crimes (tax/immigration violations) and to expose him to disgrace unless he paid a seven-figure sum. This conduct meets the definition of criminal extortion under Penal Code sections 518, 519, and 523. While the litigation privilege (Civ. Code § 47) might immunize some unlawful communications from tort liability, it is a separate doctrine with different purposes and does not mean that such conduct is also protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The court adopted the reasoning from Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, holding that when a defendant's assertedly protected activity is illegal as a matter of law, the defendant cannot meet the initial burden of showing their action arises from protected activity.
Concurring - Werdegar, J.
No. I agree that Mauro's conduct is not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute and that the motion to strike was properly denied. However, the decision should be affirmed on narrower grounds. The gravamen of Flatley's claim is the "vicious and criminal scheme" to extort money, which is not protected speech. Furthermore, even if the case proceeded to the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Flatley clearly demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits, which is sufficient to defeat the motion. I am hesitant to join the majority in creating a broad judicial exception for "illegal as a matter of law" activity at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, as this risks blurring the distinction between the two prongs of the test and could lead to doctrinal confusion, contrary to the court's previous holding in Navellier v. Sletten.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a crucial limitation on the scope of California's broad anti-SLAPP statute. It clarifies that the statute does not shield conduct that is illegal as a matter of law, specifically criminal extortion, from civil liability, even if that conduct occurs in a pre-litigation context. The ruling creates a threshold inquiry: if the defendant's conduct is conclusively shown to be illegal, they cannot satisfy the first prong of the anti-SLAPP test, and the motion to strike must be denied without reaching the second prong. This prevents defendants from using the procedural protections of the anti-SLAPP statute to force victims of illegal activity into a premature evidentiary battle and potentially recover attorney's fees.
