Flast v. Cohen
392 U.S. 83 (1968)
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Rule of Law:
A federal taxpayer has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal spending program if they can establish a two-part nexus: 1) a logical link between their taxpayer status and the type of legislative enactment attacked, which must be an exercise of the congressional power under the taxing and spending clause, and 2) a logical nexus between that status and a specific constitutional limitation imposed upon the exercise of that power.
Facts:
- Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, authorizing the expenditure of federal funds for local educational agencies.
- The Act provided funding for instructional materials and educational services for low-income families.
- These services and materials, paid for by federal funds, were made available to children in both public and private schools, including religious and sectarian schools.
- Federal funds were used to finance instruction in subjects like reading and arithmetic and to purchase textbooks for use in religious schools.
- Florence Flast and other appellants were United States citizens who paid federal income taxes.
- The appellees, including the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, were federal officials charged with administering the Act.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellants (Flast et al.) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against appellees, federal officials administering the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
- The complaint sought an injunction to prevent the expenditure of federal funds for religious schools.
- The Government moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that appellants lacked standing to sue as federal taxpayers.
- A single district judge determined the standing question was substantial enough to convene a three-judge district court.
- The three-judge district court, in a 2-1 decision, ruled that appellants lacked standing based on the precedent of Frothingham v. Mellon and dismissed the complaint.
- Appellants filed a direct appeal of the dismissal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a federal taxpayer have standing to challenge a federal spending program on the grounds that it violates the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Warren
Yes. A federal taxpayer has standing to challenge a federal statute on First Amendment Establishment Clause grounds because such a claim alleges a breach of a specific constitutional limitation on Congress's taxing and spending power. The Court's prior ruling in Frothingham v. Mellon, which created a near-absolute bar to federal taxpayer suits, is distinguishable. While Article III's 'case or controversy' requirement bars generalized grievances, standing exists when a taxpayer demonstrates a two-part nexus: a logical link between their status as a taxpayer and the challenged legislative enactment (a taxing and spending measure), and a link between that status and a specific constitutional limitation on that taxing and spending power. Here, the appellants challenged a federal spending program, satisfying the first prong. They also alleged a violation of the Establishment Clause, which historical evidence shows was specifically intended to prevent the use of the taxing and spending power to aid religion, thus satisfying the second prong. Unlike the Tenth Amendment claim in Frothingham, which was a generalized grievance about the scope of federal power, an Establishment Clause claim represents a direct injury to the taxpayer's interest in not having their tax money spent in violation of a specific constitutional protection.
Dissenting - Justice Harlan
No. The Court's new two-part nexus test is an artificial, unworkable doctrine that substitutes an irrelevant emphasis on the form of expenditure for the correct rule established in Frothingham. A taxpayer's interest in federal expenditures is not personal or proprietary but is a generalized interest held in common by all citizens, making such lawsuits 'public actions' to vindicate public rights. The majority's distinction between spending and regulatory programs, and between 'specific' and 'general' constitutional limitations, is arbitrary and lacks a logical basis. The proper approach is to deny standing for such public actions unless Congress has specifically authorized them, thereby respecting the separation of powers and preventing the judiciary from becoming a 'Council of Revision' that oversees the other branches of government.
Concurring - Justice Douglas
Yes. While joining the majority, the two-part test is not durable and the Court should have completely overruled Frothingham v. Mellon. Any taxpayer contribution, even Madison's proverbial 'three pence,' is sufficient to create a personal stake when a fundamental constitutional guarantee is violated. Taxpayers should be viewed as 'vigilant private attorneys general,' and courts should not be 'niggardly' in granting standing, especially as the judiciary is often the only place where individuals can get effective relief against the government. Waiting for Congress to authorize such suits would allow important constitutional questions to go undecided and personal liberties to be unprotected.
Concurring - Justice Stewart
Yes. The holding should be understood narrowly: a federal taxpayer has standing to assert that a specific expenditure violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Because that clause plainly prohibits taxing and spending in aid of religion, every taxpayer has a personal constitutional right not to be taxed for the support of a religious institution. This specific prohibition readily distinguishes the case from Frothingham, where the taxpayer questioned the general scope of congressional power under Article I. This decision does not undermine the principle that taxpayers cannot use federal courts to air generalized grievances.
Concurring - Justice Fortas
Yes. The ruling must be strictly confined to the proposition that a taxpayer may sue to challenge federal expenditures that violate the Establishment Clause. The unique constitutional history of the Establishment Clause provides a specific prohibition on the use of tax power to support religion, which creates the direct 'nexus' the Court describes. There is no basis in this decision to imply that taxpayer status would be a sufficient launching pad to attack any other type of congressional expenditure. This narrow opening is justified by the fundamental importance of the church-state issue in our constitutional system.
Analysis:
This landmark decision created a significant exception to the long-standing Frothingham doctrine, which had effectively barred federal taxpayer lawsuits. By establishing the two-part 'nexus' test, the Court opened federal courthouse doors to citizens challenging government spending that allegedly violated the Establishment Clause. This ruling empowered individuals and groups to litigate against public aid to religious institutions, fundamentally altering the landscape of church-state law and leading to decades of subsequent litigation over the proper boundaries of the Establishment Clause. The decision's framework for taxpayer standing would remain the controlling standard until it was narrowed by later Supreme Court cases.
