Flanagan v. State
1984 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 739, 675 S.W.2d 734 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
To sustain a conviction for attempted murder, the state must prove a specific intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt; this intent cannot be inferred solely from the use of a deadly weapon if the circumstances of its use show it was not reasonably capable of causing death.
Facts:
- Jerry M. Rhodes, an off-duty police officer, was driving his pickup truck on a freeway at 50-60 miles per hour.
- An automobile traveling erratically in the same lane was approximately 75-80 feet in front of Rhodes's truck.
- When the distance between the vehicles closed to about 50 feet, Dennis Lafaine Flanagan leaned out of the passenger window of the automobile and fired a shotgun directly at Rhodes's truck.
- The shotgun blast, which Rhodes believed contained birdshot, struck the front of the pickup truck, causing two small dents in the center of the grille and chipping some paint on the hood.
- The truck's windshield was not damaged, and Rhodes was not physically injured.
- Flanagan later testified that while he was in the car, it was his brother who fired the shotgun, and that he was shooting at roadway lights, not at Rhodes.
Procedural Posture:
- Dennis Lafaine Flanagan was charged by indictment with the offense of attempted murder.
- Flanagan pleaded not guilty and was tried in a bench trial before a state trial court judge.
- The trial court found Flanagan guilty of attempted murder.
- The trial judge assessed punishment at 20 years' confinement in the penitentiary.
- Flanagan (appellant) appealed the conviction to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.
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Issue:
Is firing a shotgun loaded with birdshot from a moving vehicle at another vehicle 50 feet away, resulting in only minor damage to the target vehicle's grille and no injury to the driver, sufficient evidence to prove a specific intent to kill for an attempted murder conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Teague
No. The evidence presented by the State is insufficient to show that appellant had the specific intent to kill Rhodes when he fired the shotgun. The intent to commit murder may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon, but this inference depends on the factual context. For the specific intent to kill to be inferred from firing a shotgun, it must be shown that the weapon was used with the capacity and under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce death. Here, the weapon was fired from 50 feet between two vehicles moving at high speed, using birdshot that caused only minor damage to the truck's grille and did not penetrate the cab or injure the driver. This indicates the shotgun blast was not capable of causing death under these specific circumstances, and therefore, the State failed to prove the essential element of specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
Dissenting - Judge Teague
No. The evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction because it was factually impossible for the appellant to consummate the intended offense of murder. The majority's analysis (in an un-provided opinion this dissent addresses) is faulty because it focuses only on the act of pointing and firing the shotgun, while ignoring whether the ammunition was capable of inflicting death. If an attempt occurs under circumstances where it was factually impossible to complete the crime—as it was here, given the birdshot, distance, and moving vehicles—then the accused cannot be guilty of the attempted offense. The State failed to prove the shotgun pellets were capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, and therefore failed to establish the specific intent required for attempted murder.
Analysis:
This case significantly refines the legal standard for proving specific intent in attempted murder cases in Texas. It establishes that the inference of intent from using a 'deadly weapon per se' like a shotgun is not absolute and can be rebutted by the circumstances of its use. The decision requires prosecutors to present specific evidence that the weapon, as employed, was actually capable of causing a fatality, rather than relying on the weapon's general classification. This places a higher evidentiary burden on the state in cases where a weapon is discharged but causes minimal or no harm, forcing a more nuanced, fact-specific inquiry into the defendant's actual intent.
