Fla. Soc. of Ophthalmology v. Fla. Optometric
489 So.2d 1118 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
When interpreting a constitutional provision, courts should favor a construction that gives effect to the provision's underlying purpose over a literal reading that would defeat it. Accordingly, the Florida Constitution affords the governor fifteen consecutive days to veto a bill presented after the legislature has adjourned sine die.
Facts:
- In May 1983, the Florida House and Senate passed Senate Bill 168, which authorized certain optometrists to administer and prescribe medicinal drugs.
- The Florida Legislature adjourned its 1983 regular session sine die on June 13, 1983.
- On June 14, 1983, one day after adjournment, the Legislature presented SB 168 to Governor Bob Graham.
- On June 29, 1983, fifteen days after the bill was presented, Governor Graham vetoed it.
Procedural Posture:
- The Florida Optometric Association petitioned the state circuit court (trial court) for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to publish SB 168 as law, arguing the governor's veto was untimely.
- The circuit court dismissed the petition with prejudice.
- The Florida Optometric Association, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the First District Court of Appeal.
- The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order, remanded with directions to issue the writ, and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public importance.
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Issue:
Does Article III, section 8(a) of the Florida Constitution provide the governor with seven or fifteen consecutive days to veto a bill that is presented to him after the legislature has adjourned sine die?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Barkett
The Constitution provides fifteen days. A constitutional provision must be interpreted to give effect to its underlying objective, which in this case is to provide the governor with an adequate opportunity to review the large number of bills passed at the end of a legislative session. The need for this additional time is most pronounced for bills presented post-adjournment. A literal interpretation limiting the governor to seven days in this scenario would thwart the provision's purpose. This interpretation is further supported by historical evidence of the drafters' intent and the long-standing, consistent practice of both the governor and the legislature, which is presumed to be correct.
Concurring - Justice Ehrlich
The Constitution provides fifteen days. This conclusion is supported by the provision's historical lineage from the 1885 Constitution, which was similarly structured and always interpreted to grant the longer veto period for post-adjournment bills. The alternative interpretation, advanced by the lower court, leads to the absurd result that a bill presented on the last day of the session receives a 15-day review period, while a bill presented the very next day, after adjournment, receives only seven. The drafters of the 1968 Constitution intended to change the length of the veto periods, not to create such a counterproductive outcome.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Boyd
The Constitution provides seven days. The language of Article III, section 8(a) is plain and unambiguous, leaving no room for judicial construction. The provision establishes a seven-day veto period and creates only two specific exceptions that extend it to fifteen days: if the legislature adjourns sine die or takes a long recess during that seven-day period. Since the legislature had already adjourned before the seven-day period began, neither exception was triggered. If this plain language creates a policy problem, the proper remedy is a constitutional amendment, not a judicial rewriting of the text.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a preference for a purposive approach to constitutional interpretation over strict textualism, particularly when a literal reading would frustrate the clear intent behind a provision or lead to an absurd result. The Court affirmed that long-standing, practical constructions of constitutional provisions by the branches of government that operate under them carry a strong presumption of correctness. This ruling solidifies the governor's veto power by ensuring adequate time for review of last-minute legislation, thereby reinforcing the executive's role as a check on the legislative branch.
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