Fishbein v. Kozlowski
252 Conn. 38, 1999 Conn. LEXIS 440, 743 A.2d 1110 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
In an administrative hearing to suspend a driver's license for operating a vehicle under the influence, the scope of inquiry is strictly limited to the four issues enumerated in General Statutes § 14-227b(f). The legality of the initial investigatory stop, specifically whether police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion, is not one of those issues and therefore cannot be challenged.
Facts:
- On March 5, 1996, police were conducting surveillance on a house at 180 Poplar Street in New Haven, which they suspected was a location for illegal drug transactions.
- At 2:15 a.m., David Fishbein drove a car to the house and stopped, turning off the vehicle's motor and headlights.
- A passenger exited Fishbein's car, went to the door of the house, knocked, had a brief conversation with the person who answered, and then returned to the car.
- Fishbein started the car and turned on the headlights, but before the car was put in motion, police officers effectuated a stop by pulling their cruiser alongside and activating its overhead lights.
- Upon questioning Fishbein, an officer smelled alcohol on his breath and noted that Fishbein had difficulty understanding a request for his registration.
- Fishbein was administered a series of field sobriety tests, all of which he failed.
- Fishbein subsequently consented to and took two breath tests at the police station, both of which showed a blood alcohol level exceeding the statutory limit.
Procedural Posture:
- The commissioner of motor vehicles suspended David Fishbein's driver's license following an administrative hearing held pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b.
- Fishbein appealed the commissioner's decision to the Superior Court (a state trial court), arguing the initial police stop was illegal.
- The Superior Court dismissed Fishbein's appeal, holding that the police had legally stopped his vehicle.
- Fishbein, as appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court of Connecticut (an intermediate appellate court), with the commissioner as appellee.
- The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
- Fishbein's petition for certification to the Supreme Court of Connecticut was granted on the limited issue of whether the police had reasonable suspicion for the stop.
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Issue:
Is the question of whether the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify an investigative stop outside the scope of the four issues to be considered at a driver's license suspension hearing conducted pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b?
Opinions:
Majority - McDonald, C. J.
Yes, the question of whether police had reasonable and articulable suspicion for an investigative stop is outside the scope of a license suspension hearing. The plain and unambiguous language of General Statutes § 14-227b(f) expressly limits the hearing to four enumerated issues, which do not include the legality of the initial stop. The court reasoned that these administrative hearings are civil and remedial, not criminal and punitive, with the primary purpose of protecting public safety by promptly removing dangerous drivers from the road. Therefore, the full procedural protections of a criminal proceeding, including the application of the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained from an unconstitutional stop, are not required by statute or due process. The court concluded that the minimal deterrent effect of excluding such evidence in a civil hearing is outweighed by the substantial public interest in road safety.
Dissenting - Berdon, J.
No, the legality of the initial stop is implicitly required to be considered because the statute requires a finding of 'probable cause to arrest' and that the person was 'placed under arrest.' An unconstitutional stop cannot lead to a lawful arrest, rendering the subsequent 'probable cause' invalid. The majority's interpretation gives police carte blanche to conduct arbitrary stops and engage in racial profiling, undermining fundamental constitutional principles. The legislative history and precedent from other jurisdictions support the conclusion that 'arrest' as used in the statute means a lawful arrest, which must be predicated on a constitutional stop. To hold otherwise allows the state to suspend a license based on an unconstitutional invasion of a citizen's privacy.
Dissenting - Norcott, J.
No, probable cause to arrest cannot be established without first meeting the threshold requirement of a reasonable and articulable suspicion for the initial police interference. The public policy goal of removing drunk drivers from highways does not override the legislature's concern for protecting the due process rights of drivers. Without a lawful basis for the stop, the police should have had no further involvement with the driver, and any subsequent evidence should not be considered, even in an administrative context. The entire administrative action is invalid if it originates from an unconstitutional police action.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the distinction between a criminal DUI prosecution and a civil, administrative license suspension hearing in Connecticut. It establishes that the exclusionary rule does not apply in these administrative hearings, meaning evidence of intoxication is admissible even if obtained following a stop that lacked reasonable suspicion. This holding prioritizes the state's remedial interest in public safety over the deterrent function of excluding unconstitutionally obtained evidence in a non-criminal context. The ruling significantly narrows the grounds on which a driver can challenge a license suspension, placing the focus squarely on the evidence of intoxication itself rather than on police conduct leading up to the arrest.
