Fisel v. Wynns
667 So.2d 761 (1996)
Rule of Law:
Under Florida Statutes sections 588.14 and 588.15, a livestock owner is liable for damages caused by their animals straying onto public roads only if the owner intentionally, willfully, carelessly, or negligently permitted them to do so, not under a strict liability standard.
Facts:
- Paula Fisel was driving her pickup truck early Sunday morning, March 15, 1992, near Bushnell in Sumter County, Florida.
- Fisel's truck struck a black cow that was standing in a dark county road at midnight.
- After exiting her truck, Fisel was struck by a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction, suffering a broken leg.
- The cow belonged to Frank Wynns, who lived alone on a forty-acre property with forty head of cattle.
- Wynns' property was enclosed by fences and contained several gates.
- The western gate, located 1400 feet from the county road and secured by a sliding latch operable only by human hands, was found open after the accident.
- Frank Wynns had used and closed this western gate the day before the accident.
- Wynns had no visitors during the period leading up to the accident and did not know how the gate came to be open.
- There was no evidence presented of Wynns' cattle having escaped on prior occasions or of past trespassers on his property.
Procedural Posture:
- Paula Fisel sued Frank Wynns and William C. Wynns in a Florida trial court for damages.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Wynns.
- Fisel appealed the trial court's decision to the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal.
- The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on the precedent of Selby v. Bullock.
- The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal certified a question of great public importance to the Supreme Court of Florida.
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Issue:
Does Florida public policy, considering modern conditions, now impose liability on a livestock owner for injuries caused by their animal wandering through an open gate, the reason for which is unknown, without a showing of the owner's negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - Shaw, Justice
No, changing conditions in Florida have not altered public policy to impose liability on a livestock owner for injuries when their animal wanders through an open gate, the reason for which is unknown, without a showing of the owner's negligence. The Court reaffirms its prior holding in Selby v. Bullock, which established that sections 588.14 and 588.15, Florida Statutes (the Warren Act), require proof of at least negligence to hold a livestock owner liable for animals straying on public roads. The legislature, in enacting the Warren Act, deliberately chose a negligence standard over strict liability, balancing the interests of public safety and the livestock industry. To impose strict liability would place an 'impossible burden' on the livestock industry, effectively making owners 'virtual insurers' and hindering agribusiness. The Court emphasizes that any modification to this established statutory policy must come from the legislature, as it is not the judiciary's role to 're-legislate that Act.' In this case, the uncontroverted evidence—that the gate was secured by a human-operated latch, Wynns had closed it, and there was no showing of prior escapes or trespassers—yielded no reasonable inference of negligence, thus making summary judgment for Wynns proper.
Analysis:
This case strongly reinforces the Florida Supreme Court's principle of judicial restraint, deferring to the legislature on matters of public policy where statutory language is clear. It clarifies that merely proving an animal escaped onto a public road, even through an open gate of unknown cause, is insufficient to establish a livestock owner's liability without evidence of their negligence. The decision sets a high evidentiary bar for plaintiffs under the Warren Act, requiring concrete proof that the owner's actions or inactions fell below a reasonable standard of care, rather than relying on an assumption of negligence based solely on the animal's presence on the road. This approach protects the livestock industry from what the court views as an 'impossible burden' of strict liability while still upholding the legislative intent to promote public safety through a negligence standard.
