Fischer v. United States
603 U. S. ____ (2024) (2024)
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Rule of Law:
To prove a violation of the obstruction statute 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), the government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity of records, documents, objects, or other things for use in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so.
Facts:
- On January 6, 2021, a joint session of Congress convened to certify the votes of the 2020 Presidential election.
- While the session was underway, a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered outside the U.S. Capitol.
- Some members of the crowd forced their way into the Capitol building, breaking windows and assaulting police officers.
- The breach of the Capitol building forced Congress to evacuate and delayed the vote certification process for several hours.
- The criminal complaint alleges that Joseph Fischer was among those who entered the Capitol building.
- The complaint further alleges that Fischer was involved in a physical confrontation with law enforcement officers inside the Capitol.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury indicted Joseph Fischer on multiple counts, including one count of obstructing an official proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).
- Fischer filed a motion in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (a federal trial court) to dismiss the § 1512(c)(2) charge.
- The District Court granted Fischer's motion, ruling that the statute was limited to conduct involving evidence impairment.
- The Government, as the appellee, appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
- A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that § 1512(c)(2) covered all forms of corrupt obstruction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the D.C. Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), which criminalizes corruptly 'otherwise obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing] any official proceeding,' apply to all forms of obstructive conduct, or is its scope limited by the preceding subsection's focus on conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
No. The scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) is limited to conduct that impairs evidence and does not cover all forms of obstructing an official proceeding. The Court's reasoning is based on several principles of statutory interpretation. First, under the canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, the general 'otherwise' clause in subsection (c)(2) must be interpreted in light of the specific, evidence-focused prohibitions in subsection (c)(1) that precede it. A broad reading of (c)(2) would render the specific list in (c)(1) superfluous. Second, the statute's history shows it was enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to close the 'Enron loophole,' where individuals who destroyed evidence themselves could not be prosecuted under the existing statute; it was not intended to be a broad, catch-all obstruction crime. Finally, a broad interpretation would create significant surplusage with numerous other, more specific obstruction statutes in the U.S. Code and would risk criminalizing a wide swath of prosaic conduct, such as peaceful protests or lobbying, with a severe 20-year maximum sentence.
Concurring - Justice Jackson
No. Justice Jackson joined the majority opinion in full, writing separately to emphasize that the Court's interpretation gives effect to the intent of Congress as embodied in the statute's text and purpose. The specific examples of evidence impairment in (c)(1) illuminate the intended scope of the general prohibition in (c)(2). The statute's enactment history, its context within the broader landscape of federal obstruction law, and its placement within a highly granular statute all confirm that Congress intended to target conduct related to evidence spoliation, not to create a new, sweeping, all-purpose obstruction felony without any clear indication of that intent.
Dissenting - Justice Barrett
Yes. The statute's plain text should be read to apply to all forms of obstructive conduct. The word 'otherwise' simply means 'in a different manner' or 'by other means,' indicating that (c)(2) serves as a catch-all provision for any means of obstruction not specified in (c)(1). The interpretive canons of ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis are inapplicable because the statute presents two distinct and independent prohibitions, not a list of specifics followed by a general term. Any concerns about the statute's breadth are overstated, as the requirement that a defendant act 'corruptly' significantly limits its scope and would screen out innocent conduct. The dissent argues that the majority atextually narrows the statute because it cannot believe Congress meant what it wrote, thereby failing to respect the prerogatives of the political branches.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the prosecutorial reach of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), redefining it as an evidence-impairment statute rather than a general-purpose tool for charging obstruction of official proceedings. The ruling has a major impact on numerous prosecutions arising from the January 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol, as it raises the evidentiary bar for the government. Prosecutors must now prove not just that a defendant's actions delayed or impeded a proceeding, but that the conduct specifically impaired or attempted to impair the integrity or availability of records, documents, or other evidentiary items. This holding reinforces the Court's tendency to construe federal criminal statutes narrowly and creates a new, binding precedent on the interpretation of 'otherwise' clauses when they follow specific prohibitions.
