Fischer v. United States
603 U.S. 480 (2024)
Rule of Law:
To prove a violation of the obstruction statute 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant corruptly impaired, or attempted to impair, the availability or integrity of records, documents, objects, or other things for use in an official proceeding.
Facts:
- On January 6, 2021, the U.S. Congress convened a joint session to certify the votes of the 2020 Presidential election.
- While the session was underway, a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered outside the Capitol building.
- Some members of the crowd forced their way into the building, breaking windows and assaulting law enforcement officers.
- This breach of the Capitol forced Members of Congress to evacuate and delayed the vote certification process for several hours.
- Joseph Fischer was among the individuals who entered the Capitol building during the breach.
- While inside, Fischer was allegedly involved in a physical confrontation with law enforcement officers.
- Fischer later claimed in Facebook posts that he 'pushed police back about 25 feet' inside the Capitol.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States charged Joseph Fischer in a multi-count indictment for his actions on January 6, 2021.
- Count Three of the indictment charged Fischer with corruptly obstructing an official proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).
- Fischer filed a motion to dismiss Count Three in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (the trial court), arguing the statute only applies to evidence-tampering conduct.
- The District Court granted Fischer's motion and dismissed the § 1512(c)(2) charge.
- The United States, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
- A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit (the intermediate appellate court) reversed the District Court, holding that the statute covers all forms of corrupt obstruction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the D.C. Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), which criminalizes 'otherwise obstruct[ing], influence[ing], or imped[ing] any official proceeding,' apply to all forms of obstructive conduct, or is it limited to conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Roberts, C.J.
No, the statute is limited to conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of evidence. To secure a conviction under § 1512(c)(2), the Government must prove the defendant impaired or attempted to impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding. The Court's reasoning is based on several principles of statutory interpretation. First, under the canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, the specific, evidence-focused list of actions in subsection (c)(1) (alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals a record, document, or other object) limits the scope of the general 'otherwise' clause in (c)(2). Second, a broader interpretation would render (c)(1) and numerous other specific federal obstruction statutes superfluous, which courts must avoid. Third, the statute's history shows it was enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to close the 'Enron gap'—a loophole related to document destruction—indicating Congress's focus was on evidence impairment, not creating a broad, catch-all obstruction crime. Finally, the Government's broad reading would criminalize a wide range of 'prosaic conduct,' such as lobbying or peaceful protests, which is an implausible outcome that gives prosecutors excessive discretion.
Concurring - Jackson, J.
No, the statute is limited by the scope of § 1512(c)(1). The text and legislative history of § 1512(c) demonstrate Congress's clear purpose was to target evidence-related obstruction, not to create a sweeping, all-purpose obstruction crime. Enacted in response to the Enron scandal involving document destruction, the statute's structure and context show no intent to establish a 'first-of-its-kind general federal obstruction crime' with a severe 20-year maximum penalty. It would be illogical for Congress to bury such a broad prohibition within a more granular statutory scheme without any clarifying language or legislative history. However, on remand, Fischer's conduct may still be prosecutable under this narrower interpretation if it is found that he impaired or attempted to impair the availability of records used in the proceeding, such as the electoral vote certificates.
Dissenting - Barrett, J.
Yes, the statute applies to all forms of obstructive conduct not covered by subsection (c)(1). The plain text is straightforward: 'otherwise' means 'in a different manner' or 'by other means.' Subsection (c)(1) prohibits obstruction by document spoliation, and (c)(2) serves as a catch-all for obstructing an official proceeding by any other means. The majority misapplies interpretive canons like ejusdem generis, as the statute's structure consists of two distinct prohibitions, not a list followed by a residual clause. Concerns about overbreadth are overstated because the statute requires the defendant to have acted 'corruptly,' which sufficiently narrows its scope to screen out innocent conduct like lobbying or peaceful protests. The Court's atextual narrowing of the statute fails to respect the broad language Congress chose to enact and usurps the prerogatives of the political branches.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), a key statute used in the prosecution of hundreds of individuals involved in the January 6th Capitol breach. By tying the statute to evidence impairment, the Court rejected its use as a general-purpose tool against any conduct that obstructs an official proceeding. The ruling reinforces the Court's trend of narrowly construing broad criminal statutes, particularly 'catch-all' provisions, to avoid potential overcriminalization and due process concerns. For future cases, prosecutors charging under § 1512(c)(2) must now connect the defendant's conduct directly to an attempt to impair the availability or integrity of specific records, documents, or other evidentiary 'things' used in the proceeding.
